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# Rules make the world better – justifications of civilian crisis management in the EU Concept Core Course

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TAPIO PELLINEN: Rules make the world better – justifications of Civilian Crisis

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Civilian crisis management is a part of the European Union's foreign policy, but it and its impacts has been studied empirically relatively little. This study explores how doing civilian crisis management is justified to personnel being trained to work on those missions. The aim of this study is to chart out what civilian crisis management purports to pursue, so creating testable hypotheses for future research becomes easier.

This study was conducted by participatory observation of an ENTRi-certificated EU Concept Core Course held by Crisis Management Center Finland in April 2017. The Core Course is the most basic training given to almost all personnel willing to work in civilian crisis management missions. It outlines the foundations, basic vocabulary, central concepts and aspects of practical work that are deemed most important for working on a mission. These observations were then analysed against a framework of liberal peacebuilding and its critique using a grounded theory methodology.

The main findings were that civilian crisis management is justified in five major ways: creating security for the EU, creating a rules-based liberal order, spreading liberal values that are deemed universal, acting as tools in foreign policy, and making societal changes efficient and sustainable. The EU's civilian crisis management subscribes to a liberal-realist hybridisation of an orthodox view on international peacebuilding, where force-controlling states shape the creation of liberal institutions and pursue their own gains while trying to balance values, rights and fairness.

Key words: European Union, liberal peace, liberal peacebuilding, civilian crisis management, liberal peace critique, CSDP

# List of abbreviations

CCM	Civilian crisis management
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CivOpsCdr	Civilian Operations Commander
CMB	Crisis Management Board
CMC	Crisis Management Center Finland
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMDP	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EEAS	European External Action Service
EGT	European Group on Training
ENTRi	Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUCCC	EU Concept Core Course
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
FFM	Fact Finding Mission
HoM	Head of Mission
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PFCA	Political Framework for Crisis Approach
PSC	Political and Security Committee
UN	United Nations
UNMIK	United Nations Mission In Kosovo
UNSCR 1325	United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

# Contents

1. Introduction.....	1
2. Aims and research question.....	2
3. Theoretical framework and its main concepts.....	4
3.1 EU civilian crisis management.....	4
3.2 EU Concept Core Course.....	13
3.3 Liberal peace and its criticism.....	17
4. Methodology and data collection.....	23
4.1 Data and its collection.....	26
4.2 Course overview and data gathering.....	27
4.3 Conducting the analysis.....	28
4.4 Limitations and critique of methodology.....	30
5. Big Picture: why the EU conducts civilian crisis management.....	31
5.1 Instrumentalist-realist reasons.....	33
5.2 Normative reasons.....	36
5.3 Legal-political reasons.....	37
5.4 Summary.....	38
6. How civilian crisis management is conducted, and why?.....	39
6.1 Comprehensive approach.....	39
6.2 Local ownership.....	41
6.3 Rule of law.....	42
6.4 International humanitarian law.....	45
6.5 Human rights.....	46
6.6 Gender and UNSCR 1325.....	49
6.7 Democratisation.....	51
6.8 Code of conduct.....	52
6.9 Summary.....	53
7. Analysis.....	54
7.1 Shaping the conduct of CCM.....	57
7.2 Civilian crisis management in a web of international norms.....	60
8. Conclusions.....	63
8.1 Results.....	64
8.2 Further research.....	67
9. Bibliography.....	69

# 1. Introduction

In June 2016 I participated in the Kiasma crisis management seminar organized by Wider Security Network, a Finnish NGO concerning itself with easing the cooperation of different military and civilian crisis management (CCM) organizations and political actors in Finland. Two lecturers mentioned that there is non-existentially little scientific research done on impact assessment of civilian crisis management operations.

This piqued my interest, as I have long had an interest in quantifying complex situations into measurable concepts. The way people see the world working is easily biased, especially in an area like peace and conflict research, where most people highly agree on the broad normative ideas ('peace is good, war is bad') that tend to be very complex and murky on a closer look.

To my mind, any field, especially those with a strong normative or policy-oriented outlook, needs to constantly mine their assumptions and biases from the bedrock of normalized ideas to be visible, criticizable and testable against reality. To have any kind of meaningful empirical testing, there must be some way to conceptualize what one wants to test.

As I looked into the matter, it became clear that the body of academic research concerning civilian crisis management is quite minor. This is mostly due to the limited usage and slight obscurity of the term 'civilian crisis management': it is quite a recent term that is used mostly by the EU to denote their political crisis management missions of non-military nature. Finding any scientific research on civilian crisis management proved to be very challenging. On the subject of assessing the impact of those missions, I could not find any scientific research. The nearest hits were from assessing development aid programs and peacekeeping operations, neither of which exactly matches the context of civilian crisis management operations.

During the preparatory stage of this study it became clear that it is hard to gain access to the actual methods currently used to assess impact in civilian crisis management missions. These missions are very varied in type and mandate, and I was unable to find

people or organisations who would have done actual assessment work. In the EU, there seems to be no unified approach to impact assessment.

Paucity of previous research was a main reason for why I chose civilian crisis management as my subject. There is a clear need for research in this area, and I find it preferable to try to do a thesis work that could be of use to others wanting to study the same subject.

## **2. Aims and research question**

Currently civilian crisis management missions that are defined as such are most actively done by the EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). CCM missions are an important tool for the unified Europe's international security and defence policy, and thus considerable amount of funds and work is funnelled to and through them. International crisis management participation is also a key part in Finnish foreign policy (National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management 2014, 10).

How these resources are used, and are they used well? Do the civilian crisis management operations fulfil their purported purpose as policy tools? What impacts, whether foreseen or unexpected, do they have? How civilian crisis management operations affect peace, conflict and structures upholding them? There are many important questions regarding civilian crisis management, answers to which often would have policy relevance. However, there was precious little existing research to draw from.

Most research on the EU's CCM has been done on the decision-making and legal frameworks surrounding it (Blockmans & Wessel 2009, Kuhn 2009), the scope and problems of resources and capacities (Major & Bail 2011, Korski & Gowan 2009) and CCM as a part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (Brylonek 2014, Tamminen 2017). In line with Suhonen's observation (2016, 10-11), it was notable that most of the research available has been done by institutes of foreign affairs, think tanks, non-governmental organisations and national organisations connected to civilian crisis management.

There seems to be a blind spot in current academic research: empirical work done to understand CCM is not available. How the strategies and policy papers are translated into

concrete actions? What the people connected to CCM work actually think, hear and do? What goes on in the missions on the ground level? As for assessing the impacts of CCM, I was unable to find any prior works that would have detailed the assumed mechanisms and effects that CCM is supposed to utilise in pursuing its general goals. My work was done to set a stage for further studying of these two aspects.

To start chewing this elephant into a thesis-sized bite, I needed a suitable starting point through which I could gain access to civilian crisis management. A branch of EU's civilian crisis management in Finland, Crisis Management Center (CMC), fit the bill well. Similar institutions in different EU countries are responsible for training and finding the needed civilian crisis management personnel for EU operations. By focusing on this grassroots-level preparation I could study some of the common denominators that are taught to the personnel of the missions. As an added bonus, although the language of this thesis is English, I could communicate with CMC in my native Finnish.

As the scope of this work was limited by both temporality and geographics, focusing on just CMC was defensible, although this limits the generalizability of my results.

The aim of this thesis study was to start staking out a basis of understanding and vocabulary of what civilian crisis management entails and how it is seen in CMC's basic training. I intended this work to become a basis I hoped I would have had when I started planning this study: for example, studying impact assessment of civilian crisis management would be much easier to start if someone else has done the preliminary mapping of the concepts that are used. On the other hand, this study tried to recognize discourses and perspectives that are visible in the training, and also to further position civilian crisis management into the context of academic peace and conflict research.

There is a single most common denominator for Finnish civilian crisis management training: the EU Concept Core Course (EUCCC). This is the basic training that most people who wish to join a civilian crisis management operation go through. The course consists of lectures, exercises and scenario training in subjects such as rule of law, negotiation and mediation, and threat awareness.

The EUCCC course in CMC Finland is certificated under Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) programme, which coordinates and creates capability for the training of civilian crisis management personnel in different EU countries. This means that the course taught by CMC Finland is as officially-sanctioned as they get, which makes it an adequate representative of civilian crisis management training in European Union.

As previous research on CCM is limited, the research questions that I can meaningfully answer in a master's thesis with such a diffuse subject are of qualitative sort. To measure something, you must first know what you try to measure. This study is essentially a look at what sort of effects and impacts civilian crisis management claims to aim at. Hopefully this will eventually make studying the measuring and assessing the impact of civilian crisis management a bit easier.

So, how to structure the research questions to both get a general view on the subject matter and focus the study in such a way that would shine light on the reasonings behind CCM, distilling them into something that could be used as falsifiable hypotheses in the future? To accomplish this, I formulated this research question:

***How the reasons and methods of doing civilian crisis management are justified and legitimized in the EU Concept Core Course?***

### **3. Theoretical framework and its main concepts**

In this chapter, I will detail the theoretical concepts that I have used in this study and how these concepts relate to it.

#### **3.1 EU civilian crisis management**

Defining the actions that EU can take in civilian crisis management is hard. According to Kuhn (2009, 248), there is no consistent terminology in the EU documents that would define or even name what kinds of actions the EU can undertake in this field.



Even 'civilian crisis management' (CCM) itself is a bit of a chimera, with no real equivalent in the terminology employed either by the UN, the OSCE or other regional organizations (Kuhn 2009, 253). As a concept, it was created by the EU, but other actors have similar civilian-expert led functions. (Suhonen 2016, 8)

The official ENTRi handbook *In Control*, which is distributed to personnel on the EU's ENTRi-certificated core training course for civilian experts, does not define civilian crisis management as a concept. Instead, it talks about crisis management, which can be of either military or civilian type. Crisis management is mentioned to be roughly equivalent to the UN term peace operations. Further, crisis management is said to mostly consist of two parts: crisis prevention measures, such as peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and mediation, and deploying crisis management missions. Any mention of military aspects of crisis management is omitted here, even though they are mentioned later as part of the toolbox of Common Security and Defence Policy. (Lauffer & Hamacher 2016, 23-24, 32)

Commonly civilian crisis management refers to developing and strengthening central societal functions of a state via non-military expert aid. Usually this takes the form of reforming the security sector and developing the administrative capacity of a country. Civilian crisis management missions range from supporting, monitoring, advising or training to performing executive functions in lieu of the local authorities. (Suhonen 2016, 8)

EU crisis management can consist of two types of action, although sometimes they are used interchangeably. Crisis management *missions* are usually focused on the civilian aspects, while crisis management *operations* usually have a military component. They are often combined in civilian-military crisis management, even if combining the legal sides can be challenging. (Kuhn 2009, 248)

EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts and the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 were strong statements for uniting the cooperation of the European Council and the European Commission (Nowak et al 2006, 12).

Nowak et al see the crisis management of the European Union to be different from that of other international organisations such as the UN and the OSCE, even as the above-mentioned objectives are quite similar in each organisation. The main difference is that EU

crisis management is placed in the context and framework of EU's "external action". The EU has its own foreign policy and foreign relations, both of which affect its foreign policy objectives and thus can have an effect on how and when it conducts crisis management. This can be heightened as all Union member states have their own interests and objectives, which the EU decision-makers must usually take into account. (Nowak et al 2006, 10)

### 3.1.1 Crisis management of the EU

Crisis management in the European Union stems directly from the Treaty on European Union that was signed in Maastricht in 1992 and that entered in force in 1993. In it were set the objectives for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. These included:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(Treaty on European Union, title V: *Provisions on a common foreign and security policy*, article J.1.2)

The Maastricht treaty laid the groundwork for the Common Foreign and Security Policy which would become also the basis of crisis management and civilian crisis management of the EU. The willingness to create this kind of joint effort stemmed from two sources in particular: the hegemonic international position of the United States and the slow and insufficient responses of European nations to the crises of former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. These factors led the European governments to a consensus that as EU possessed considerable political and economic clout, it would be appropriate, useful and necessary to take more responsibility in international affairs. (Groves 2000, 3)

Another related factor is the changing of norms covering international peace operations in the post-Cold War period. The basic assumption of inviolable territorial integrity of states

weakened while acceptance towards international actions and interventions increased. (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009, 5)

A convergence of the East and Central European revolutions and this shifting of values resulted in Western will to both support and actively promote the liberal ideals. This was coupled with the modern around-the-clock news coverage to make an increasing number of Western governments needing to communicate the normative basis of their foreign politics to prevent losing legitimacy to suspicions of double standards. Eventually this would lead to a pursuit of an 'ethical foreign policy' in many Western countries, with also the EU integrating similar thinking into agreements it made with third countries. (Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008, 82)

### 3.1.2 The Petersberg tasks

As a way to achieve similar norm-promoting objectives, the Western European Union, which was eventually integrated in the newly formed European Union, had a meeting of foreign and defence ministers in June 1992 and formulated the Petersberg Declaration. In it was announced that the military units of the Western European Union member states could be deployed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. These tasks are known as the Petersberg tasks or operations. (Pagani 1998, 738)

The Western European Union did little to act in civilian crisis management capacity (and it was finally disbanded officially in 2011), but part of its functions were integrated into the Treaty on European Union in the Amsterdam Treaty that was signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999. These included the Petersberg operations, which were thus placed into the European Security and Defence Policy. This was first time when peacekeeping and peace-related operations were codified into a legally binding, fundamental constituent treaty of an international organization. (Pagani 1998, 739-741)

In the European Council Summit in Cologne in 1999, the military crisis management capacity of the EU had a lot of attention: it was recognized that fulfilling the Petersberg tasks would require increase in the military capacities of the EU. The structures to guide

and decide on such actions were still formed, even if the capacity to actually conduct operations was still questionable. (Groves 2000, 6)

Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2007 and came into force in 2009. In it was settled that the Petersberg tasks would be extended with conflict prevention, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilisation tasks. (Shaping Common Security and Defence Policy 2016)

As Pagani mentions, the EU constituent treaty curiously does not have geographical limitations that would limit the areas where the EU could conduct the Petersberg operations. The most important limits to the Petersberg operations come from the Treaty on European Union's Article J.7.2, which rules out non-consensual peace enforcement operations, and from general international law, which puts restrictions on how military interventions and force can be used in international relations. The latter was also put in letter into the Treaty on European Union as adherence to the United Nations Charter, principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, as mentioned earlier. (Pagani 1998, 741)

### 3.1.3 Civilian crisis management appears as a term

As attention of both the EU and the Western European Union was focused strongly on the military aspects of crisis management, particularly the Nordic EU member states raised the need to develop the EU's non-military crisis management capabilities. A draft report by the Finnish Presidency before the European Council Summit in Helsinki in 1999 argued that the non-military crisis management tools would need to be developed in step with the military sector advances. (Groves 2000, 7)

The final version of the report, however, focused again almost exclusively on the military sector. In the summit was set the Helsinki headline goal, tasking the EU member states to be able to deploy and sustain forces capable of all the Petersberg tasks by 2003, with smaller rapid response elements to be established within that goal. Other advances included decisions to develop capabilities in command and control intelligence, and strategic transport. (Groves 2000, 7)

The non-military crisis management capabilities were not completely forgotten: they were mentioned in an additional annex, but the wordings were broad and not very clearly defined. Existing experience or resources were mentioned to be abundant, but they were defined loosely and widely: "civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal rehabilitation, search and rescue, electoral and human rights monitoring, etc." (Helsinki Summit Conclusions 1999, Annex 2 to Annex IV)

The EU member states were to further assess and inventory what resources they had available and how they could be utilized as part of the EU rapid reaction capabilities. This included pre-identifying personnel, materials and funds that could be used if an operation conducted by the UN the OSCE, or autonomous action by the EU would require them. (Helsinki Summit Conclusions 1999, Annex 2 to Annex IV)

Compared to the military aspects of EU crisis management, which have been clearly defined and developed within the European Security and Defence Policy and the subsequent Common Security and Defence Policy, defining the civilian aspects of EU crisis management has been much harder, as the number of possible policies and instruments is considerably larger. (Nowak et al 2006, 10-11)

In the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira in 2000, the EU civilian crisis management started to take its shape. Even as military sector still had the spotlight, an institutional structure was established. This structure was the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) to "provide information, formulate recommendations, and give advice on civilian aspects of crisis management to the interim Political and Security Committee." It seems that this was the first official use of the term 'civilian crisis management', but formulation of concrete targets was left to the next, French Presidency. (Santa Maria da Feira Summit Conclusions 2000, chapter III to Annex I)

This Study on Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management identified four priority areas for the EU, and they were included in the Presidency Conclusions. The areas were policing, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection, and they were intended to be the centers of gravity which EU would focus on in operations that would be led by the UN, OSCE or the EU. (ICG Issues Report 2 2001, 31)

In these areas EU was seen to be able to provide "an added value" when responding to crises. Still, only one specific target was given: to develop the ability to deploy 5000 police officers for international operations. This target was accepted by the European Council, and the rest of the suggestions were very ambiguous. (Groves 2000, 12)

This ambiguity reflects the fact that defining the civilian aspects of EU crisis management has been much harder than those of the military aspects of EU crisis management, which have been clearly defined and developed within the European Security and Defence Policy and the subsequent Common Security and Defence Policy. The reason for this is that the number of possible policies and instruments related to the civilian side is considerably larger. (Nowak et al 2006, 10-11)

The term 'civilian crisis management' is wide in its meaning. National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management 2014 of Finland is the most recent policy document in Finland that considers it at length. According to it,

*"The goal of civilian crisis management is to restore the functioning of society by seconding impartial, non-military expert assistance to crisis areas. Civilian crisis management supports the development of the state's key societal activities and the strengthening of its vital functions."* (National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management 2014, 10)

The basis of civilian crisis management that Finland operates on is defined as

*"coordinated expert action, based on strengthening human rights, democracy, social and gender equality, which, pursuant to rule of law principles, promotes peace, stability and sustainable development."* (National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management 2014, 9)

Individual measures mentioned are conflict prevention, maintaining peace and stability, and strengthening civil administration, rule of law, human rights and democracy. As for the large-scale strategic aim, civilian crisis management's point is to be a tool for stabilising conflict areas and preventing new global threats, thus enhancing Finland's security. International responsibility-sharing is also mentioned. (National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management 2014, 10)

### 3.1.4 The European Security Strategy

Another important landmark on the way to EU civilian crisis management was the European Security Strategy (ESS) that was accepted by the European Council in 2003. Its birth was spurred by the split between EU member states on the US-led invasion to Iraq, as a more strategic vision was deemed needed. ("European Security Strategy", Shaping Common Security and Defence Policy 2016)

The strategy recognized that interstate conflicts had been largely replaced by intra-state conflicts. The key security threats for Europe were identified as:

- 1) Terrorism, with Europe both as a target and base for it
- 2) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- 3) Regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East, Kashmir, the Korean peninsula and the Great Lakes region
- 4) State failure, linked to bad governance and civil conflict
- 5) Organised crime

The interconnectedness of these threats, with regional conflicts and state failure as a breeding ground for terrorism, with financial linkage by organised crime, was given a special emphasis.

(European Security Strategy 2003, 1, 3-4)

Concerning civilian crisis management, most interesting passages of the strategy was the accentuation of multi-faceted crisis management, with military means taking a supplementary seat as part of restoring order in failed states and in post-conflict regions. Promoting good governance and strengthening states was seen as the most important thing in building security for the EU, both in geographic proximity and in a global way.

(European Security Strategy 2003, 7, 10)

*"The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order."* (European Security Strategy 2003, 10)

Policy implications of the strategy mentioned again multi-faceted crisis management, with active aspiration. Emphasised were preventive engagement with "early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention." (European Security Strategy 2003, 11)

### 3.1.5 Setting up a mission

When a crisis is noted, two EU actors can initiate a response from the EU: the Political and Security Committee (PSC) or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). Crisis Management Board (CMB) kick-starts the creation of a Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) while communicating with the European Commission. (Lauffer & Hamacher 2016, 79)

The PFCA is a base document that details what is happening, why the EU needs to act, and what tools the EU should use. These can include, for example, diplomatic action, humanitarian aid, or economic sanctions, and they also include the possibility to engage the crisis by using the actions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) such as civilian crisis management. If CSDP engagement is deemed desirable, the PSC or the European Council tell the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMDP) to either ponder on what CSDP options are used, or to create a Crisis Management Concept (CMC), which analyses what a mission could achieve via what tools. CMDP will consult relevant parts of the European External Action Service (EEAS), third states, international NGOs and civil society actors. (Lauffer & Hamacher 2016, 79-80)

The CMDP sends a Fact Finding Mission (FFM) to research the situation and ensure that the local authorities are on board with the EU actions. The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) advise the PSC, who endorses the CMC that has been created. The European Council then approves the CMC. (Lauffer & Hamacher 2016, 80-81)

The PSC tasks the director of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), acting as the Civilian Operations Commander (CivOpsCdr), to start recruiting the core team of the mission, the Head of Mission (HoM) and planning the actual operation. At this stage, the European Council establishes the mission via a Decision, officially deciding the budget,



objectives and mandate for the mission. Recruiting staff starts afterwards, being led by the CivOpsCdr. (Lauffer & Hamacher 2016, 81-82)

The CivOpsCdr also draws on the CMC to draft a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) with the HoM and the core team, consulting EEAS services as needed. The PSC again endorses the CONOPS draft and the Council approves it. The CivOpsCdr drafts an Operational Plan (OPLAN), which is then once more endorsed by the PSC and approved by the Council. When the mission has achieved the minimum practical requirements to start the mission implementation, the Council adopts a decision on launching the mission. (Lauffer & Hamacher 2016, 82-83)

### 3.2 EU Concept Core Course

In 2001, the European Commission with a group of EU members started the European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Its goal was to create common standards for training the personnel in civilian crisis management operations. In the beginning in 2001, the name of this first project and network of training institutions was 'the Core Group', which was later dubbed the 'EU Group on Training'. In 2007 the name changed to the 'European Group on Training', EGT. (European Group on Training 2009, 7, 39)

The EGT project aimed at "promoting EU training cooperation, identifying joint approaches to civilian training, developing common training modules and common training through courses". The first common training standards were agreed on at a conference in Madrid in 2002. The training modules that were developed were the basis for the standardisation of civilian training in the EU. (European Group on Training 2009, 7-8, 13)

Since in the beginning there were existing channels for training police, election observers and civil protection personnel at the EU level, this civilian crisis management project focused on training other kinds of experts that were needed. These included rule of law and human rights experts, civil administrators, and press and media experts. Police and civil protection training were eventually incorporated into it. (European Group on Training 2009, 11, 15)

One of the noted advantages of this sort of common approach was that it made a certification system for accrediting courses possible. This in turn led to a possibility to evaluate individual courses against an objective standard, making quality improvement easier. Every training institution creates their own programme for the courses they teach, but they must reflect the commonly agreed concepts for those course types. (European Group on Training 2009, 14, 15-16)

Finland's Crisis Management Center (CMC), the national institution responsible for training civilians for crisis management missions, is a result of Finland joining this training project. (European Group on Training 2009, 9)

EGT and the European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management ran from 2001 to 2009 (Rehrl & Weisserth 2013, 115). The work done within the EGT set the first standards for civilian crisis management training and established the network of institutions both training and developing training. That work was then continued under a new name in 2011, when a project called Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) was launched by the European Commission under the EU's Instrument for Stability. (Creta et al 2017, 20)

ENTRi focused "on the preparation and training of civilians, from EU Member States and third countries, who are either going to, or already working in, crisis management missions worldwide." It was also defined that these missions include those done by the EU, the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the African Union (AU). (Action Document for Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) III, 35)

ENTRi is still ongoing. The previous work in providing training packages and materials, trainer-training and harmonizing of training standards has continued. There has also been formalisation of cooperation with the European Security and Defence College, the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations, the European Policy College and the European Union Police Services Training Consortium. (Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 2016, 27)

To give a feel of the scope of ENTRi, in the second phase of the project between 2013 and 2016, a total of 994 participants were trained on 44 ENTRi courses. Most numerous nationalities were Italians (11 %), Finns (9 %), French (8 %) and Romanians (8 %). 45 percent of participants were seen as female, and gender balance of the courses was considered during the selection process. 74 percent of participants were from a civilian background, 22 percent were from the police, and 3 percent from the military. (Final Narrative Report on ENTRi-II, 6-7, 8-9)

Currently ENTRi is scheduled to run until May 2019. 90 percent of the funding comes from the European Commission, with the rest funded by the implementing partners. The current coordinator of the initiative is the Center for international Peace Operations located in Berlin. (ENTRi III At a Glance, 1)

During an interview, the course director Kuisma Kinnunen said that most of the first drafts for course concepts are written in Austria, but all organisations belonging to the ENTRi consortium take part in developing the courses.

While not mentioned in the interview, the Austrian institute belonging to the ENTRi consortium is called the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution. It is the organisation responsible for civilian crisis management personnel training in Austria, working under a similar pretext to CMC Finland. The Austrian center's strong position in the process of course development likely stems from that it was responsible for coordinating the first phases of the European Commission Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management when the whole concept was first launched (European Group on Training 2009, 39). It must be noted that despite working together on ENTRi, the different national organisations differ in their histories and scopes of activity.

EU Concept Core Course (EUCCC) is one of the courses developed and certificated by the EGT/ENTRi. It is generic introductory training that allows for education on common subjects and soft skills related to civilian crisis management missions. It is meant to supplement mission-specific pre-deployment training programmes, whose schedules are often so tight that country briefings and security updates take precedence. The core course seeks "to provide participants with a realistic insight into the daily work in peace

operations and prepare them for the numerous challenges they might encounter in the field." (Course Concept for the Core Course, 3)

The goals of the course are quite manifold, encompassing many different skills and spheres deemed necessary for basic training:

*Core courses provide participants with general knowledge and soft skills required in their line of duty. Soft skills include inter-cultural communication, negotiation and mediation techniques, working with interpreters, stress management, and gender awareness. The course also provides participants with insights into the structure and specific functional units in peace operations, their mandates and lessons learned from previous mission experiences.* (Course Concept for the Core Course, 3-4)

The first curriculum for a core course was developed by the EGT in 2002 and revised in 2006. It was used to conduct multiple courses between 2002 and 2009. (Course Concept for the Core Course, 5)

The current concept of the core course was drafted by the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution and the German Center for International Peace Operations. It was accepted by the other ENTRi consortium members in 2012. (Course Concept for the Core Course, 1)

Need for such a core course is explained as a difference in access to preparatory training between police and military staff on one hand and civilian experts on the other: the former have usually much more possibilities to get training on how to actually work in a field operation. (Course Concept for the Core Course, 3)

The course consists of 6 major subject areas (Course Concept for the Core Course, 6-15):

1. Introduction to crisis prevention and crisis management

Concepts and strategies for crisis prevention and crisis management

Overview of field activities

Democratization, good governance and civilian administration

Rule of law & human rights

2. The role of various actors in crisis prevention and management

The role of the EU

The role of the UN and OSCE

Comprehensive approaches to multi-functional peace operations

Co-operation with the civilian police

Co-operation with NGOs

### 3. Mission working environment & cross cultural communication

Cultural awareness

Gender and peace building

Code of conduct

### 4. Field work techniques

Conflict transformation techniques

Project management

Monitoring and reporting

Communication via interpreters

### 5. Safety and security

Personal safety

Mine awareness

Radio communication

Road safety & driving in hazardous environment

Map reading and field orientation

### 6. Personal Health and stress management

Personal hygiene and basic first aid abroad

Stress management

Dealing with trauma

## 3.3 Liberal peace and its criticism

In this chapter, I will briefly go through what are liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding, and what are their main critiques. As I will argue in this chapter, civilian crisis management is one form of liberal peacebuilding. The literature that criticizes liberal peacebuilding is

not, however, based on analysing civilian crisis management. Much of the liberal peace critique is applicable to the EU's civilian operations, but Richmond, for example, has focused his critique mostly on UN-led interventions.

Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009) broadly define peacebuilding as actions "aimed at preventing the resumption or escalation of violent conflict and establishing a durable and self-sustaining peace." It covers "security, development, humanitarian assistance, governance and the rule of law", while "addressing the underlying sources of conflict", "building or rebuilding peaceful institutions and values", and "building or rebuilding institutions of governance and the rule of law." They also note that the objectives and components of peacebuilding are subject to debate and disagreement. (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009, 3, 5, 8-9)

During the Cold War, international peace operations were mostly concerned with containing conflicts between sovereign states so that a political solution could be achieved. Post-Cold War peacebuilding has emphasized the idea that for a peace to be sustainable, attention must be given to a wide range of social, economic and institutional needs. As a reflection of a liberal project, this has meant aspects and features of liberal democracy and market economics. (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009, 5-7)

As a result of this focus on institutions in line with market economics and democracy, contemporary peacebuilding is often called 'liberal peacebuilding'. (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009, 10-11)

The end of the Cold War marked the expansion of the liberal peace project, where a major method of engaging conflict is by constructing liberal states. If problems arise, they are mostly attributed to problems of integrating the liberal ideals and efficiency in those areas. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 4)

Liberal peacebuilding assumes that threats to international security come from failing or weak states or non-state actors instead of powerful aggressive states. In consequence, powerful international actors use great efforts and resources to contain, resolve or prevent civil wars. (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009, 9)

The concept and basis of the EU's civilian crisis management is closely linked to the concept of liberal peace. According to Richmond & Franks (2009), liberal peace is a discourse, framework, and structure that contains its own epistemology of peace. Its ideals, including that of governance reform, are based on democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neoliberal development. A liberal peace is formed when these aspirations are balanced in the context of sovereign states. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 4-5)

Newman, Paris and Richmond state that liberal peace rests on the idea that "certain kinds of (liberally constituted) societies will tend to be more peaceful" both domestically and internationally. This idea is related to democratic peace, which is a theory that "consolidated democracies do not go to war with each other" as they have numerous internal constraints preventing that, and they stand to lose economically in an interdependent economy. (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009, 11)

Liberal peace can also be seen to result from constructing legal frameworks based on norms that are thought to be universal. If values are shared on an international level, a community of states is formed, instead of just a system of states. As peace inside states can rest on a certain type of constitution, preserving socio-economic order, or by constructing a society that is just and equal, proponents of theory of liberal and democratic peace believe this idea of domestic peace will also work in a similar fashion in an international community. (Richmond 2008, 10-11)

Richmond and Franks detail four main strands of thinking inside this framework of liberal peace. These strands have evolved over a long period of time stemming from antiquity, and are both contradictory and complementary. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 5)

The first, or victor's peace, is an argument that if a peace is the result of military victory and rests on the hegemony or domination of the victor, that peace is likely to survive (Richmond & Franks 2009, 5). My reading of this argument is that while similar concepts are often connected to realist thinking, modern liberal interventions are not completely without their own version of a victor's peace. It is most visible in the first, usually military stages of interventions, such as the one conducted in Libya in 2011 by a NATO-led

coalition; for liberal peacebuilding to be possible, there must first be enough security to permit it, and that security can be achieved via military submission.

The second strand is that institutional peace is upheld by international institutions, international norms and normative and legal context that states agree on multilaterally. The third is constitutional peace, arguing that peace needs democracy, trade and cosmopolitan values stemming from the idea that individuals are important in themselves, not just as a means to an end. The last is civil peace, which comes from direct action, citizen advocacy and often transnational mobilisation defending basic human rights and values. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 5)

In liberal peace, the liberal state is the framework which is used to create peace at local, state and international levels. This is achieved through governmentalism and the related institution building, conceptualized as 'peace-as-governance', where institutions of the state are the focus of state-building that guarantees a peace. This peace-as-governance is a current convergence of the four strands of thinking detailed above. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 6)

In the liberal peace model, there are graduations in how the liberal peace project is approached. The conservative model is characterised by a top-down authoritarian imposition of state-led peacebuilding, political conditionalities and military intervention, reflecting the victor's peace. The orthodox model focuses on statebuilding, liberal institutions, and transferring ideas, objectives and norms via consensual negotiation. While much more sensitive to local ownership than the conservative model, the orthodox model still assumes that peace is state-led and that liberal peace is a universal ideal, with the peacebuilders as technically superior to their subjects. The emancipatory model is a more critical approach, emphasizing local ownership, consent and a bottom-up approach. While it still assumes universalism, it does so in a discursive and locally negotiated way. Unlike conservative and orthodox models, a peace is not seen as only internationally or state led, as private actors and social movements are also important. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 8-9)

The commonly agreed-on threads of these models can be seen as a sort of a "peacebuilding consensus", but such a thing is unlikely to really exist except in a very



general way. It is the rough idea that democracy, free markets, the rule of law and human rights, and developmental processes are the necessary means to solve conflicts in a lasting way. This rough consensus has been used as a way to exclude from peace processes participants who disagree on some qualifying goals, such as the adoption of free markets, elections or human rights. Establishing these things have essentially become the goal of peacebuilding: the international community is unwilling to invest in other formulas of governance. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 9)

As the "peacebuilding consensus" exists mostly on a very general level, on the concrete level there tends to be internal competition and contradictions between actors who subscribe to different graduations or strains of thought. This easily leads to inconsistencies and undermining of the larger process. Differences are also visible in different stages of the peacebuilding process: conservative version of liberal peace finds supporters in emergency periods. In post-conflict phases, orthodox model is often applied as a softer approach to redefining the state in a desired form. When sustainability becomes an issue and exit strategies are planned, emancipatory model gains traction. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 9)

The idea of liberal peace rests on the assumptions that its principal components eventually diminish the perceived root causes of conflict and make the peace sustainable. To achieve this, those tenets need to be correctly implemented, the host community must be receptive to them, and the resulting polity has sovereignty but adheres to international liberal norms. These solutions are the "universal blueprint" used for reconstruction, as international funding for other methods is practically impossible to find, but it seems that there are environments where the user community is unwilling to implement and operate them as intended. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 9, 139-140)

Richmond and Franks argue that a defining feature of liberal peacebuilding currently underpinning international peacebuilding activities is an unannounced combination of statebuilding and peacebuilding. Statebuilding focuses on political, economic and security architecture, with a desired outcome of a neoliberal, sovereign and territorial state. Peacebuilding is focused on "the needs and rights of individuals, on sustainable communities and on the requirements for a self-sustaining polity of equitable representation without placing sovereignty, territory and the institutions of the state before

that of the mundane needs of everyday life." Liberal peacebuilding is a compromise agenda between statebuilding and peacebuilding. It often veers towards statebuilding, but uses peacebuilding as a framework for gaining legitimacy. From this tension results many uncomfortable compromises. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 181-182)

Richmond argues that aspects of a victor's peace in liberal peacebuilding are hidden by assuming that liberal peacebuilding can be done everywhere and that it will lead to a self-sustaining peace. Liberal peacebuilders do not only build liberal institutions and societies, but they also create multiple layers of 'peace-as-governance' that shape the resulting peace and what is perceived as 'the local'. That peace is often negotiated between interveners such as international actors, donors and liberal states, with the locals playing a more marginal role. (Richmond 2008, 108-109)

Applying the orthodox liberal peace model has a number of problems often experienced in missions. Lack of resources compared to the task of essentially building a state, lack of local participation and consent, poor coordination and excessive overlap among interveners, emphasis on international actors instead of local recipients, and ignoring cultural and welfare issues and problems in the recipient societies. (Richmond 2008, 108)

This highlights an incoherence, noted by Richmond, of the ontology that liberal peace is predicated upon. There are three states of being that are supposedly simultaneously existing: liberal peace is built on sovereign constitutional democracies, or on institutions, or on human rights and self-determination. To fit it all together, the liberal peace needs to have hierarchies and regulation: hegemons decide what is a priority in the political or economic sphere, and human rights and self-determination are placed in that framework. This system is then made representative by democracy. But as the priorities underlying the system are set by hegemonic outside actors, contestation is likely to follow due to the inefficiencies, cultural biases and lack of support for everyday life of the recipient communities. Liberal peacebuilding has a blind spot regarding the welfare aspects, cultural activity, and environment of that everyday life, focusing instead of building institutions and creating a "virtual state." (Richmond 2008, 114-115)

Richmond argues that a sustainable peace requires sufficient welfare for individuals and families, as that is what makes it possible for them to form peaceful and stable

relationships with other people and state and governmental institutions. This is supplemented by recognizing cultural and identity dynamics of locals and improving and preserving their environment. (Richmond 2008, 115)

So, liberal peace is critiqued for its overt focus on building empty state institutions, whereas targeting the welfare of local individuals and small communities would be a more important base to build peace upon. Richmond sees this as a result of a cultural barrier, where the internationals' trust towards liberal ideologies, institutions and economic processes prevents them from working with the local conflict environment, opting instead to work with other elite actors already subscribing to liberal ideas (Richmond 2008, 115).

My base assumption is that CCM done by the EU is likely to fit the notion of liberal peacebuilding, making the critique of said peacebuilding applicable in analysing this CCM. Speculating from this base, the EU's CCM probably utilises some version of this convergence of peacebuilding with statebuilding. This assumption seems likely, as there is a strong state-centric capability development element in CCM (Finland's National Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management 2014, 10). Liberal peacebuilding in the context of the EU's CCM is likely to be state-centric and see capable liberal states as guarantors of both domestic and international peaces. It is also likely that the Core Course's view of the EU's CCM probably struggles in working with non-liberal actors and focuses on interactions between actors subscribing to a liberal view of how an optimal society functions or is governed. It is also probable that CCM is seen as a complementary to the 'peacebuilding consensus', not challenging its basic tenets of democracy, free markets, the rule of law, human rights, and development processes as fundamentals of solving conflicts peacefully in a lasting manner.

## **4. Methodology and data collection**

In this chapter I will detail the methods I used to gather and process my data. I decided to use grounded theory as a guiding framework as it is a very flexible approach when there is no certainty about what sort of results could be expected. I was also already familiar with grounded theory methodology due to utilizing it in my Bachelor's thesis.

As Charmaz puts it, "grounded theory methods consist of systematic inductive guidelines for collecting and analyzing data to build middle-range theoretical frameworks that explain the collected data." (Charmaz 2000, 509)

Charmaz positions constructivist grounded theory on a middle ground between postmodernism and positivism. This constructivism "assumes the relativism of multiple social realities, recognizes the mutual creation of knowledge by the viewer and the viewed, and aims toward interpretative understanding of subjects' meanings." (Charmaz 2000, 510)

Essentially Charmaz (2000, 510-511) argues that:

*The rigour of grounded theory approaches offers qualitative researchers a set of clear guidelines from which to build explanatory frameworks that specify relationships among concepts. Grounded theory methods do not detail data collection techniques; they move each step of the analytic process toward the development, refinement, and interrelation of concepts. The strategies of grounded theory include (a) simultaneous collection and analysis of data, (b) a two-step data coding process, (c) comparative methods, (d) memo writing aimed at the construction of conceptual analyses, (e) sampling to refine the researcher's emerging theoretical ideas, and (f) integration of the theoretical framework.*

The explanatory power of a grounded theory stems from how it renders and orders the data into concepts that explain whatever is studied. These concepts or categories need to be drawn from the data: they cannot be brought in on a whim, if they do not originate from the data itself. (Charmaz 2000, 511)

To sum up, in grounded theory, data is coded as it is collected. Coding defines and categorizes the data, as codes are created through studying the data. There is a need for interaction and questioning between the researcher and the data. This coding creates new perspectives and informs subsequent data collection. Notably, Charmaz draws a distinction between grounded theory's approach to coding and that of quantitative research where data is sorted into preconceived standardized codes: in grounded theory, the codes emerge from the researcher's interpretations of data.

In the marching order presented by Charmaz (2000, 515-516), the generation of grounded theory begins from line-by-line coding. In line-by-line coding of the data, single unit of coding is a single line of the text, which is then coded according to what happens in it, preferably as an action, thus describing what event or act happens in it. Strauss and Corbin (1998, 57) call this process microanalysis, as it can be applied also to individual words, sentences or paragraphs, instead of just lines.

This is made to find what kinds of previously unknown, systematic occurrences can be seen in the data. Selective or focused coding uses these frequently appearing codes to go through large amounts of data. Then, categories for synthesizing and explaining data are drawn from those focused codes, and those categories shape the analytical frameworks that are developed. A category can contain numerous codes. To turn these categories from descriptions to conceptual analyses, their properties are then specified analytically. (Charmaz 2000, 515-516)

Essentially, this is a process of distilling the themes found in the data to more and more lucid forms to create analytical concepts that can be compared across the data.

After coding, the next stage is memo writing to elaborate processes, assumptions, and actions under the codes. This detailing connects categories and defines how they fit to larger processes. The memos re-connect raw data with the analytic interpretation that has been drawn from it. (Charmaz 2000, 517)

Charmaz (2000, 517-518) mentions that memo writing helps researchers (a) to grapple with ideas about the data, (b) to set an analytic course, (c) to refine categories, (d) to define the relationships among various categories, and (e) to gain a sense of confidence and competence in their ability to analyse data.

I interpret this as a sort of an interlude to digest the analysis afoot, allowing it to guide the direction of research process and creating traceable thought structures.

Next stage is theoretical sampling. It is likely that the developed categories contain holes both from the original data and the theories drawn from them, so when they are noticed, more data is collected, but sampling for only these specific issues. This is not done to

increase the size of the original sample but to refine ideas that have already emerged. Charmaz strongly advocates theoretical sampling as a necessary part in creating a solid grounded theory: the first iteration of data gathering is done to get data that can be used to create relevant and well-defined categories to explain that data and guide the next iteration of data gathering, allowing for understanding "when, how and to what extent" the created categories are useful and pertinent. (Charmaz 2000, 519)

Theoretical sampling allows for testing and understanding the categories that have been created to find out what is their relevance and context. As there is an emphasis on studying process and theoretical sampling, it is possible to both sketch the limits of the categories, but also to define what kind of things remain between the categories. (Charmaz 2000, 519)

## 4.1 Data and its collection

I used three major sources of data for my analysis.

The first data source was written material of the EU Concept Core Course taught by CMC Finland. CMC Finland provided me with access to all the teaching materials of the Core Course as electronic .pdf files. These files are composed of PowerPoint slides used by the lecturers.

My second data source was interviewing the training officers in charge of coordinating the contents of the EU Concept Core Course. Modules of the course are taught by a plethora of experts who work according to a curriculum set by the certifying body known as Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi). As the lecturers are independent and supervise only their own lecturers, the training officers have the best general idea of what goes on during the whole course.

Interviewing the people doing the actual teaching would have been a step closer to how the course truly is conducted. But, as there is little existing scientific inquiry into CCM, interviewing the teaching personnel would contain a large risk of doing a lot work for modest gain; there was no existing information available about what modules and teachers are actually relevant to this study, so I stepped back one level to make a more rough map

of the territory. Limiting this study to interviewing the training officers also kept the total research workload moderate, as the interviews were used in the planning phase of the study, not analysis.

The third and the most important data source was participatory observation of the theoretical section of the EU Concept Core Course. From a preliminary look into the written material and the interviews, it became clear that analysing just them would not have been enough to conduct a meaningful analysis. By utilising only written materials would have been detached from the actual reality of the classroom, where there was much conversation and oral lecturing accompanying the slides and handouts.

One important benefit of this kind of a multi-methodical approach was reduction of inappropriate certainty. It means that if answers gained via data gathered with a single method are clear, the researcher may erroneously believe that they are the "right" answers. Mixing up methods facilitates generation of alternative answers which lessen the risk of inappropriate certainty forming. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2011, 39)

## 4.2 Course overview and data gathering

My data-gathering started in January 2017, when I gained access to the curriculum of the basic course, but without the actual teaching materials.

In February and March of 2017 I recorded my interviews with two training officers of CMC Finland, Kinga Devenyi and Kuisma Kinnunen. Both interviews were roughly an hour long, and were done one-on-one in semi-private settings at the University of Helsinki and the Helsinki Railway Station. I had prepared a list of questions for a semi-structured interview, and asked follow-up questions when necessary.

The Core Course was held from 2nd to 6th of April. As the first day of HEAT course was mostly lectures about personal security, I decided to stay for that day also to gather wider data about how security is seen on the course. Thus I observed the course from the beginning to 7th of April, for a total of six days of training, even though I chose not to include this last day into my final study to keep the focus on the Core Course.

I ate breakfasts, lunches and suppers with the course participants and spent the lessons in the back of the class, taking notes on my laptop. When the participants were divided into teams for some exercises, depending on the situation I either observed one of the groups or waited for them to present their accomplishments to the whole group.

During these 5 days I wrote 57 pages of notes and 4 pages of study diary. I also downloaded 33 pdf files of varying lengths, which contained the lecture materials used by the lecturers. While observing, I took notes of what was taught and paid special attention to interactions and challenges between the lecturers and the course participants.

Observing the course allowed me to make more varied observations regarding how the theories, materials and ideas for the course translated into actions and interactions. Observation also allowed me to further develop concepts and categories I had formed based on the interview materials, and ditch the ones that weren't relevant.

This rolling and ongoing collection of different forms of data fit well with the grounded theory methodology I used. I was able to gather data, analyse it by forming concepts and categories and use those to inform both my research design and my subsequent data collection, which informed data collection after that. Both the interviews and the observation period forced me to redesign my study, as I found faulty assumptions in my research design that were highlighted by exposure to the reality of the course. Most relevant of these changes was dropping the impact assessment perspective, as I found that the EU Concept Core Course was an ill-suited environment for studying that.

### 4.3 Conducting the analysis

In January 2017, I read through and coded the curriculum of the course, writing a memo of that process. As I was very unfamiliar with the course material, the coding was quite unsophisticated. Most interesting observations at the time were a slight emphasis on desired attitudes and practical skills, and an almost complete lack of anything to do with assessing the impact of missions.

In February and March 2017 I coded the interviews I had made with the two training officers of CMC Finland and wrote the analysis memos about them. At the time I thought to



directly study how mission impact is assessed in civilian crisis management. Those interviews made it very clear that it is a topic that would be next to impossible to study through the EU Concept Core Course, as anything even remotely parallel would be just a very small part of the course. According to the training officers, assessing mission impact is a speciality skill that is not needed to be taught to all future mission members.

Other themes that rose from the interviews were different levels of security, desired attitudes for mission members, and the division between the actual mission work and the mission design decisions made by the political leadership. As I had not yet seen the actual course, I was unable to assess if any of these themes would be robust enough to be the focus of my research.

As both the amount of material available to me and the focal idea of the study continued to be unsatisfactory, I headed to observe the course with a very abstract idea of studying what sort of perceptions on peace and conflict are expressed during the course. To ensure that I would have a wealth of material to analyse in case I had to redesign my research again, I did not focus on this idea of perceptions during my observations.

After each day of observation during the course, I wrote my impressions and ideas into a research diary and compared them to the diaries of previous observation days. This allowed me to check if those impressions held true during the course or if they were upturned later.

When the course was done, I coded my observation data and wrote memos about it. While going through my codings, memos, and emergent themes, I wrote my subsequent analyses and ideas into an analysis diary. This allowed me to bounce different themes off each other and see what kinds of relationships they had with each other.

To answer my research question on how EU CCM is justified on the EU Concept Core Course, I went through my material looking for answers to the question 'why?' on two levels: why CCM is done and why certain methods and concepts are used in it? Answers to these 'whys' formed the basis for my analysis.

After collecting all the justifications I could find, I went another level deeper into the analysis by trying to find connections between them. What themes would repeat and in what contexts? How these themes would relate to the existing literature on liberal peace? Had other researchers found similar patterns? The results of this analysis form the core of my actual findings.

## 4.4 Limitations and critique of methodology

There are a number of limitations inherent to this study. Foremost is the scope of my data: I studied only one iteration of the EU Concept Core Course, held by one particular organisation in one particular country. This limits generalizability of my results, as there are likely to be differences even between courses organised by CMC Finland, not to mention courses organised elsewhere in Europe. However, this is tempered by the fact that these courses are ENTRi-certificated, making them parts of a long-time project to standardize CCM training on a European level. The aims and curriculum are similar on all ENTRi-certificated courses in Europe, but different lecturers likely have different perspectives and teaching methods.

My original notes and research diary from the course numbered at 57 pages written on a computer. Additionally I had access to 33 pdf documents containing slides and material used in the lectures. My study contains only one interpretation and reading of this collection of data, trying to tease from it answers to one research question. As this is a descriptive and interpretative analysis of observation data done by a single researcher, researcher bias is possible. As the qualitative nature of this study prevented the use of statistical methods as a failsafe, my main defence line against bias was to focus on doing the first coding pass on my data before starting any deeper analysis. This was to prevent me from projecting my first ideas into the rest of my coding.

My own position is also not neutral, both due to chance and human limitations. I was born in liberal Finland to liberal and highly educated parents, and I grew up amidst a palpable excitement about Finland joining the EU. I have also had the opportunity to travel widely the EU area. These factors and others like them have shaped my personal world view, which is quite in line with a liberal Nordic reading of what can be called "the European values". Problematicacies contained therein are not immediately self-evident to me, as I have

been surrounded by these values for most of my life. A pro-EU-bias is likely to affect my observations and reasoning in some way, although my precautions against it hopefully limit its effect.

## **5. Big Picture: why the EU conducts civilian crisis management**

In the following chapters 5 and 6 I will present my data in its entirety, and I have postponed all analysis into chapter 7.

This section will lay out some more data on the Core Course and go through the big whys of the European Union's civilian crisis management as seen in the core course. What are the expressed motivations that drive the launching of and participation in civilian crisis management missions? What shapes the policies behind them? What they are supposed to achieve? What are the justifications that are given? This is a description of the justifications and legitimisations I found in the EU Concept Core Course, and they form the base for my subsequent analysis.

CMC Finland holds the Core Courses biannually, with one course in spring and one in autumn. The EUCCC XXV course I observed was held from 2nd of April to 13th of April 2017. In addition to the Core Course, another ENTRi-certificated course named Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) was also conducted, with some participants only joining that part.

A total of 26 participants had signed up for the Core Course, with 6 more coming later for the HEAT course. According to statistics told on the course (day 1, course introduction), on 18 courses held between 2006 and 2015, 379 people were trained. This makes the mean number of participants about 21 people per course, meaning this course was slightly bigger than most.

The course was held completely in English. A clear majority of participants were Finnish, and I noticed 4 people who did not speak Finnish. While I do not have detailed data on professions of the participants, there was at least representation from armed forces,

university researchers, police, border guard, lawyers, and development organisations. A few people had former experience from peacekeeping, civilian crisis management, or other international missions.

There were two main venues for the course. The first half, with the more theoretical parts, was taught in the premises of the Police University College in Hervanta, Tampere. The hostile environment awareness training was taught in Jämijärvi, both next to and in the training area of Niinisalo garrison. The days were long, starting with breakfast before 8.00 and continuing until 18.00 or 19.00 in the evening, with variable breaks for coffee and dining.

In my data, the quoted reasons for doing CCM can be divided into three major types: instrumental-realist, normative and legal-political reasons.

I decided on using these categories as a part of my analysis because they rose directly from my reading of the data and they open distinct perspectives. All the data coded as 'justifications' was also dividable into these categories: while some justifications were hybrids that could fit into two categories, not justifications were left out of the categorisation.

The instrumental-realist reasons are mostly concerned with practical gains that civilian crisis management missions have for the participating states and organisations. While this category of reasons could also include the practical gains for the individual persons participating, that aspect was not discussed on any of the lectures. This category includes using civilian crisis management as a tool for foreign or security policy.

The normative reasons are ones stemming from ethical considerations of values and norms. Examples of this category would be lines of reasoning based on human rights and normative declarations that gain their justification from what is right and just in itself.

The legal-political reasons are those where the justification hinges on a legally binding base or a widely agreed contract. This includes things such as invocation of agreed-on concepts in the treaty on European Union or common decisions made by civilian crisis management actors in the form of mandates.

The categories of justifications represent differing modes of thinking and structuring civilian crisis management. instrumental-realist justifications were mostly concerned with how to achieve results that are wanted. Normative justifications were shown as limiting and propelling actions based on ideals of what is right or wrong. Legal-political justifications were derivative, based on formal agreements and work already done and accepted to shape decision-making.

It should be noted that the categories sometimes blend with each other: especially normative and legal-political justifications often co-exist, as the norms included in civilian crisis management are usually codified into legal-political agreements. I still found a separate normative category to be useful, as I argue for the rather obvious view that norms and values, whether undeclared, vocalized or codified, form the basis of the whole concept of civilian crisis management. Even a very practical view of civilian crisis management as a policy tool to gain advantages can be derived from values such as what is the role of states or collections of states like the EU.

## 5.1 Instrumentalist-realist reasons

There was one particularly clear theme that was voiced multiple times as a motivation for conducting civilian crisis management: security of the European Union and its citizens. It is inherent in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and thus in civilian crisis management, as it is a tool in CSDP. One lecturer even hammered the point home by saying that ensuring this security was what both CSDP and the EU are all about (day 1, EU CSDP and Comprehensive Approach, course opening).

This security is partly created by upholding "the state and societal resilience surrounding the EU" and by regional cooperation that has an "integrated approach to conflicts and crises", forming a "global governance for the 21st century." (day 1, EU CSDP and Comprehensive Approach)

It was also mentioned that civilian crisis management missions are not only about doing good things for the population in the mission area, but also for the prosperity of the union and promoting its interests. The EU's main interests were expanded on as being "security,

prosperity, democracy and rules-based order." (day 1, EU CSDP and Comprehensive Approach)

The reason for the EU to participate in external action, such as civilian crisis management, was justified with a polarity between two choices concerning possible security threats. The first possibility would be to protect yourself and the second would be to engage with the problem and its source, which is what the EU wants to do. This was further elucidated by an example of the reason to send a policing mission to the Horn of Africa: it is to get to the roots, although the nature of the problem or the roots themselves was not mentioned. Interestingly, it being also "a value-based responsibility" was added to the reasons. It could be argued, however, that the EU still sends such missions to protect itself, therefore this polarity between wrapping up in self-protective security and engaging with the sources of the threats is not an exclusive choice. (day 1, EU CSDP and Comprehensive Approach)

On the other side, when talking about dimensions of different severity of crisis and conflict management, an additional motivation was brought up. If all the dimensions of crisis management have failed, from development aid to humanitarian aid to civilian crisis management to military crisis management, the fifth dimension is that the crisis imposes domestic costs on the EU, "as people leave their home countries to find a better place to live." This idea was further expanded by saying that "Currently some African countries have 8 % of their population leaving yearly. I have seen projections that in the future, if conflicts in Africa continue, the amount of people leaving will be unprecedented." (day 1, EU CSDP and Comprehensive Approach)

In the lecture about the reasons for promoting rule of law, the security challenges of the EU were mentioned in quotes: "With new threats, the first line of defence is often abroad." "There is no wall around Europe. So, the EU must think what is happening outside the union to be safe." This was further expanded on by painting the world as increasingly connected, contested and complex place, where "internal and external security are ever more intertwined" and "To promote the security and prosperity of our citizens and to safeguard our democracies, we will manage interdependence." (day 3, rule of law)

The costs were further detailed when talking about conflict analysis. The costs of conflicts were mentioned to happen on all levels from individuals to states to regions. There are

human costs, including people who "might need to flee their homes or countries." Conflicts affect "international trade, refugees, terrorism, etc.", with terrorism's root in conflict being explicitly pronounced. (day 3, conflict analysis and conflict resolution)

Another justification for civilian crisis management was its use as a foreign policy tool. While it was not dealt with much compared to other justifications, it was still mentioned in multiple lectures.

In the very first lecture about the basics of civilian crisis management (day 1, course opening), there was talk about how the mission mandates are formed. It was narrated as "a result of the political considerations of the member states. Rephrasing, rephrasing, again and again."

During a break, I asked the lecturer about the desired impacts of civilian crisis management missions. He responded that, "Sometimes it seems that it is not the point of the missions to have an impact, but to act as foreign policy tools."

Later the lecturer mentioned that when the OSCE was putting together the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, the Finnish political leadership wanted to put many Finnish people on the mission. This was a result of wanting to show that Finland is active in this operation, as Finland is a neighbour of Russia and the OSCE was the only organisation that could affect the Ukrainian crisis.

Later (day 1, EU CSDP and Comprehensive Approach) this was expanded upon when a lecturer asked the participants' views on the differing motivations between launching missions when the same impacts could also be achieved by a simple project. A participant answered that it is to be seen. The lecturer agreed and continued that it is "to show that we are politically active in that area."

In a similar vein, during a rather heated discussion about the benefits of the monitoring mission in Georgia (day 2, monitoring and reporting), a participant argued that while the actual monitoring, with its limits and problems, might not achieve much, "there is also the function of presence, being present in the mission area."

To sum up, the instrumental reasons for justifying the EU's civilian crisis management are manifold. Essentially it is seen as a way to obtain security for the EU and its citizens, and one way of achieving this is to also enhance the security of peoples and nations surrounding the EU.

The EU also wants to affect its surroundings in the world in a way that is favourable to it. This is one of the driving rationales behind supporting election and legislative efforts with civilian crisis management. Especially the rules-based global order is an important concept in this: while it is an important ethical value, it also has deep practical meaning for the EU. A rules-based global order between nations upholding the rule of law and human rights is an order where the security of the EU and its citizens is easier to ensure.

On the other side, civilian crisis management is a part of the EU's efforts to keep foreign conflicts from imposing costs on the EU. These costs could be in the form of entangled internal and external security, instability, migrants and refugees, terrorism, and troubles for international trade to mention some.

Lastly, civilian crisis management missions are used as tools, both by the EU and individual member states, for conducting foreign policy and advancing political interests. This is achieved by showing activity in desired areas and regions or by supporting wanted political developments abroad.

## 5.2 Normative reasons

When justifying civilian crisis management, normative reasons were understandably less concrete than instrumental reasons. Civilian crisis management was seen as a way to promote, uphold and strengthen values such as "safety & security, democracy or representation, rule of law, human rights, freedom & equality, economic development and international relations" (day 1, course opening)

This is a quite comprehensive checklist of liberal values, with next to zero surprises. The only surprising omission is that a free market economy is not mentioned.



It is noteworthy that there was very little variation in how the values were seen by the members of the EU: the discrepancies between member states' views on policing were contrasted with how there is a strong consensus on the values that the EU members want to uphold (day 1, EU CSDP and Comprehensive Approach). This is likely linked to that most of these values are already agreed on in the Treaty on European Union: diverging from them on the rhetoric level is thus very unlikely, even though the actions of members states could show great diversity in how they are interpreted.

This is in line with a quote (day 3, rule of law) mentioning again how "the EU will promote a rules-based global order." On one of the first lectures, this concept of rules-basedness was mentioned in connection to international law. While 'rules-based' was mentioned as such only three times during the course, the whole idea of the EU's civilian crisis management was strongly situated into having "international law as the background for all operations" (day 1, EU CSDP and Comprehensive Approach).

Last of the visible normative reasons for civilian crisis management is a sense of responsibility: when considering the reasons for sending a police mission to Horn of Africa, instrumental reasons were seasoned with mentioning that it is a value-based responsibility to help. On a lecture about the nature of peace and conflict this was elaborated by saying that solving conflicts is also a moral responsibility of the international community.

To sum up, the EU has agreed on values it wants to promote, and they are strongly of the liberal kind. This same liberal streak continues in that the EU sees international law and a rules-based global order as the foundation of its civilian crisis management activities.

These values are pulled into action at the international stage by a sense of responsibility. While it was not elaborated on much during the course, it seemed to be a core value underpinning the whole idea of external actions such as development aid and civilian crisis management.

### 5.3 Legal-political reasons

When considering the "why" of doing civilian crisis management, there are very few legal-political reasons governing that directly. No treaty or agreement seems to demand sending

civilian crisis management missions. Rather, agreements and treaties govern what kinds of missions can be sent, in what kinds of situations and with what kinds of aims.

The clearest legal-political call for civilian crisis management that was expressed during the course was a synthesis on a few things: first, how the Treaty on European Union binds its members to promote and uphold the values of the Union; second, how that Treaty requires its members to provide security for its citizens and the Union; third, how the Common Security and Defence Policy allows civilian crisis management to be used as a tool for achieving the first two things, amongst other things.

A similar vein continued with other treaties and agreements, such as the Millennium Development Goals 2015 or the Feira council decisions. While no agreement demands civilian crisis management as a particular action, they define the possible goals and limits of such actions and build a framework of concepts that can be used to justify taking the political steps towards launching a mission.

In a way, legal-political reasons for doing civilian crisis management are not exactly answers to the question "why to do a mission." The legal-political reasons governing whether to launch a mission or not work from the opposite direction: while the treaties and agreements do not demand a mission to be launched in certain circumstances, they put limits on when and what sort of missions can be launched. Without political will for a mission, there will be no mission because of legal-political reasons. However, legal-political reasons may block a mission of certain type and goal from being sent, even if there would be political will.

As a result, legal-political reasons are much more visible when they shape how missions are conducted.

## 5.4 Summary

Two instrumentalist-realist reasons dominate the motivations for undertaking CCM missions: ensuring the security of the EU and its citizens, and giving both the EU and its member states various tools for conducting their foreign policies. This focus on practical issues was compounded by the fact that there was not mentioned any legal-political reasons that would oblige the EU to launch CCM missions. Instead, they are an option that

can be used when desired, and while a "responsibility to act" and liberal values were mentioned as normative reasons for doing CCM, they also played a minor part.

## **6. How civilian crisis management is conducted, and why?**

This section is about the justifications of how civilian crisis management is done by the EU. What are the central highlights and ideas that the EU wants to guide the actual work done on the missions? How these concepts and approaches are rationalized and grounded? What is done and why it is rational?

Unlike in the previous chapter on the motivations behind doing civilian crisis management, I have divided the text by concepts used in civilian crisis management instead of types of reasons. I still use the categories of instrumental-realist, normative and legal-political reasons, but now I take one concept at a time and explore it through the categories of reasons. This is a result of the more abstract ideas presented above that allowed jumping between lectures and themes, whereas the same approach towards these more specific concepts would make the text much harder to follow.

### **6.1 Comprehensive approach**

According to the course lectures, the EU's Comprehensive Approach is "the strategically coherent use of EU tools and instruments" when answering to external crises and conflicts. These include diplomatic actions, economic sanctions, missions and operations falling under the Common Security and Defence Policy, conflict prevention measures, development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, trade and so on.

Comprehensive Approach also includes creation of a political framework for how the EU deals with the crisis: this means deciding on and analysing the political context and features of the crisis, reasons for the EU to act and what instruments and tools are available and suited for working with that crisis.

On the first day, a major point mentioned in the EU's approach to crisis management was this need for addressing several components of a society with multiple tools. Comprehensive Approach was first justified with concerns about money and sustainability of impact, expressed via a cartoon (figure 1). It was a picture of a hole-filled barrel, where different planks were named after different aspects of society like security, justice, courts, elections, free media, good governance and so on. Into the barrel was poured a torrent of water that was named "Expert\$, troop\$, External action, aid".

The metaphor was explained as that "fixing just one blank is not enough: if the approach is not comprehensive, resources used can not achieve long-lasting effect." Thus, if a comprehensive look on the society and situation surrounding a mission is not taken into account, the effect of the mission will not be long-term enough to justify the resources used. Later in the same lecture, when talking about the gender balance of Finnish civilian crisis management experts, it was also mentioned that women play an important role in "fixing the barrel in a sustainable way." This was not elaborated further at the time, however.



Figure 1: Original picture courtesy:

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On a slide was quoted the 2015 Annual CSDP Lessons Report as saying that "Comprehensive Approach improves efficiency and sustainability of mission results", with no further explanation.

All in all, Comprehensive Approach was justified with only instrumental-realist concerns regarding efficiency and long-time effects. While a legal-political reasoning was briefly visible due to a slide mentioning a 2013 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, which outlined and defined Comprehensive Approach, that reasoning was

not talked about at all. Likewise, there were no mentions of normative reasons for applying Comprehensive Approach.

## 6.2 Local ownership

Multiple lecturers mentioned the importance of local ownership. This concept means that the local communities and governmental or organisational counterparts of the foreign experts are included in planning and conducting the missions. Instrumental reasons for this were focused mostly on impact, sustainability and efficiency of the missions.

Local ownership was also connected to it being a transition strategy (day 4, local ownership and democratisation). It was recognized that the mission must eventually leave, and if the locals have an ownership of the situation, work following the departure of the mission is much easier for them.

A slide said "no one can make anyone else's peace", and it was followed by saying that "we must take into account local culture and traditions. It is not possible to impose a sustainable peace" (day 2, international actors). Another quote (day 4, local ownership) said that, "Peace is a process that must involve the entire society toward transforming attitudes. Sustainable peace can only be built from within, by the people themselves, drawing upon their own resources." In both cases, local ownership was clearly framed as a prerequisite for the sustainability of any peace that is desired.

This was expanded by saying that "Conflict happens in local communities, so when making peace, we must make sure that the local communities are doing it", and this was called a key principle of civilian crisis management (day 4, local ownership and democratisation). This demonstrates quite an important line of thought in how civilian crisis management sees itself in the ideal form: its aim is not to give or force solutions from the outside, but to act as an enabler for the local actors. To deviate from this was implicated to be courting problems of unsustainability and ineffectiveness: in the same lecture, local ownership was said to support "sustainability and efficiency of the work done, as locals are there before conflict and after mission."

Theme of effectiveness was also continued when saying that local ownership "ensures that local needs are better addressed". Here effectiveness seems to mean especially effectiveness in affecting the sort of changes and solutions that locals need and want. Local ownership was also mentioned to strengthen the legitimacy of the mission, which has both instrumental and ethical dimensions: the instrumental consideration is that if the mission is perceived by locals to be legitimate (and addressing the local needs better helps here), it is easier for the mission members to do their work. Enhancing the legitimacy of a mission also helps to ensure that it is an ethically defensible undertaking.

This concept of needs of the locals was approached from a different angle when speaking about project management: the help given should be "demand driven, not supply driven", meaning that solutions need to be based on an analysis of what is actually needed, instead of falling into the trap of supplying some kind of help that is easy for the international organization to supply. This is again connected to the efficiency justification: pouring resources into actions that are not actually important or needed is ineffective use of those resources.

Normative reasons given were that local ownership "enables the local people to take control of their own destiny" and that it "respects the sovereignty of the society" (day 4, local ownership and democratisation) Both these reasonings have an effect of placing civilian crisis management into a context of cooperation and aid that is in its ideal form separate from coercive and imperative ways of affecting change in foreign countries. Respecting the society and having local people take control of their own destiny are framed as desirables.

Legal-political reasons for local ownership were not mentioned.

## 6.3 Rule of law

The United Nations definition (day 3, rule of law) for rule of law is a principle of governance where laws:

- 1) bind all persons, institutions and entities in their jurisdiction,
- 2) are equally enforced and independently adjudicated and
- 3) are consistent with international human rights norms and standards.

There was also a slide about "EU definition?", with the question mark included and no sourcing provided. The slide mentioned following characteristics:

- 1) legality
- 2) legal certainty
- 3) prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers
- 4) independent and impartial courts
- 5) effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights
- 6) equality before the law
- 7) effective enforcement

Rule of law was presented (day 3, rule of law) as a "backbone of any modern constitutional democracy" and as a way to create a functioning judicial system, without which there cannot be "a well functional society." Choice of words makes it very clear what kind of yardstick is used: rule of law makes societies function "well", all from the viewpoint of the European Union and a liberal view on international policy.

This form of thinking becomes increasingly vocalized in the lecture: helping or making states "function well" in the EU sense is beneficial for the EU, as it helps the EU to form a rules-based global order that protects the EU citizens and democracies. This connects back to the whys of doing civilian crisis management in the first place.

As a state-building approach, it is hard to imagine modern democracies being able to promote other approaches. And in the EU context, there is no choice, as promoting the rule of law is a legally binding obligation for the EU according to the Treaty on European Union.

As mentioned in chapter 6 on justifying doing civilian crisis management, promotion of rule of law was justified by it being a part of answering to security challenges facing the EU, and part of that happens often abroad. This was expanded by telling how the complexity of the contemporary world means that internal and external security are intertwining more and more, creating a need for strengthening a rules-based global order, towards which promoting rule of law is a tool. This is again a quite instrumental concern, even if it exists on a high level of abstraction.

Promotion of rule of law was also directly mentioned as addressing "the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights", as well as "managing interdependence" to "promote the security and prosperity of our citizens and to safeguard our democracies." Exactly how rule of law pertains to these goals was not detailed.

Numerous instrumental advantages for a society that applies rule of law were mentioned:

- 1) Control over own bureaucracy
- 2) Political prestige or financial support
- 3) Buffer against controversial decisions
- 4) Promotion of trust and social cohesion
- 5) Making actions more predictable and credible
- 6) Strong interrelation between rule of law and development
- 7) Resolution of disputes by peaceful means

When considering the missions falling under the category of rule of law missions, there were some interesting mentions of the timescale considered. The lecturer mentioned that the missions are short, but the needs and wanted impacts are long term ones. Because "complete institutional change will take 40 years", the point of the rule of law missions is not to "change things, but to start to change things. Make the start so that the next organization, who comes after the civilian crisis management mission is over, in the form of development aid, can continue from that." This view emphasizes strongly that civilian crisis management missions that aim for institutional change must be a part of long-time organized effort to change things.

In an after-lecture interview, the lecturer mentioned that the relevance of rule of law is giving the big picture of the changes in deep structures that the EU's civilian crisis management is trying to achieve: a lack of open conflict is just the situation where that kind of work on the deep structures is possible. And without impacting those structures, any change made is not sustainable.

In the same interview the lecturer also mentioned that from her viewpoint, the EU is trying to achieve long-lasting impact and development of the target society instead of just achieving a lack of open conflict. She elaborated this by saying that what she wanted the



course participants to understand was that "even if you pacify a situation for a moment, it is not sustainable, if the deep structures are not affected."

As a summary, promoting rule of law was mostly justified by its instrumental-realist effects. The EU wants to shape the world around it in a way that is aligned with rule of law, as it will make things more easy, stable and secure for it. The advantages accorded to rule of law -based societies tell a lot about what the EU values: this is underlined further by the use of the term "well-functioning society" when describing the effects of rule of law.

Rule of law was seen to consist of a set of tools used to affect deep structures in a target society. It was also positioned as separate from managing actual open conflicts, being a type of approach that requires a modicum of peace to be possible to work on.

There is also the legal basis of rule of law in the Treaty on European Union, which is again seen as the definitive legal-political commitment shared by the EU member states.

The normative reasons for promoting rule of law stem from the very deeply-ingrained view that rule of law is required for a society to be well-functioning. This places rule of law into a position of a yardstick that can be used to measure how well-functioning a society is, and promoting rule of law is the same as promoting good and well-being of the society.

## 6.4 International humanitarian law

International humanitarian law is a collection of principles, rules and binding agreements that shape how armed conflict is conducted, so as to not to cause undue suffering. It was said that "If you fight a war, there are things you need to do, but balanced with humanitarian concern. As even when you fight a war, there are things you do not do" (day 3, international humanitarian law).

The EU's promotion of international humanitarian law was first justified by a mixture of normative and legal-political reasons: it was mentioned to be a binding core principle of the EU, and that promoting it is a matter of justice and equality: "Why should other countries deserve less?" This positioned the EU view on international humanitarian law as the high echelon of achievement, which is ethically correct to disseminate elsewhere.

An instrumental reason was mentioned to be that "Violations of international humanitarian law render post-conflict settlement more difficult."

More reasons for promoting international humanitarian law were also mentioned (day 3, human rights): its aims were said to be to "define the rights and obligations of the parties to a conflict in the conduct of hostilities", to "minimize human suffering" and to "protect the lives, physical and moral integrity of persons not taking or no longer taking an active part in hostilities, the sick and wounded, prisoners and civilians" (sic). These are a collection of instrumental reasons, with their normative background visible.

The normative reasons were expanded by going through the history of international humanitarian law. This was done by showing a video of that history, with Henry Dunant's experiences leading to founding of the International Red Cross, and the first Geneva convention, and how international humanitarian law has formed since.

The video was made in a very emotion-inducing way, like with a photorealistic gun muzzle was shown atop an animation with a child's voice narrating how his village was attacked, or a futuristic soldier deliberating whether to shoot a child or not, and deciding to shoot. The last line of the video was that "International humanitarian law makes sure that living together is possible after the last bullet is shot", ending with an instrumental concern.

In this video the rationale behind why upholding international humanitarian law is ethically correct was not vocalized, but the message was very clear nonetheless: breaking international humanitarian law is on par with shooting children, which seems to be inherently undesirable to most people.

## 6.5 Human rights

Human rights are "basic rights that are universal and inherent to human beings. Inalienable, they cannot be given away. They are indivisible, interrelated and interdependent." They include things such as

1) "Civil and political rights, like freedom of speech, association, voting, right to private life, citizenship, freedom from torture, and freedom of movement" and

2) "Economic, social and cultural rights: education, work, shelter, food, medical care, equal pay for equal work, family life, and social security." (day 3, human rights)

The lecture was started with a group exercise outdoors that was used to demonstrate and visualize how human rights matter in an emotion-inducing way. Each participant was given a closed paper detailing a role, such as "23 years old gay man from Morocco", and asked to imagine life as that person. When the lecturer read a statement, the participants would take a step forwards if the person whose role they had would agree. These statements were things like "I can read and write", "I haven't seen hunger", "I can choose my religion", "I can vote in elections", "no-one in my family has been killed in a war", or "I have never been raped."

After a couple of moments of questions and steps, the participants were quite spread out. The lecturer then asked why this spreading out happened, and a participant answered that "Those in the front have their human rights respected." The lecturer continued that one of the points of the exercise was to demonstrate how human rights violations are not dependent on the country of one's residence, but on various circumstances.

This exercise seemed to be also partially designed to forge an emphatic link between the participants and people who suffer from not having their human rights respected. I classify this as a type of a normative reasoning: while the ethical norm was not vocalized out loud, a concrete demonstration of types of injustices suffered by different people made a subtle emotional argument that such injustices should not be tolerated.

The exercise seemed to have had an emotional impact, as the lecturer ended the exercises by asking the participants "Did you at any point look back?", and one of the participants in the front answered in a hushed tone: "No, not once." This was met with a nervous, quiet laughter from the other participants. This laughter did not in any way sound like mirth or amusement, but more like a diffusion of conflicting emotions resulting from realizing the symbolism of the situation.

The lecturer was also challenged on some of the core assumptions of the exercise. One participant noted that to answer a question like "I can read and write" from the viewpoint of

a woman from Sub-Saharan Africa or a man from Europe, they relied on stereotypical assumptions that mask the diversity underneath them.

Directly expressed normative reasoning for upholding human rights was very abrupt: human rights were mentioned to be one of the core values of the EU, and that's it.

Legal-political justifications were abundant: it was mentioned twice that the Treaty on European Union obliges the EU to uphold human rights. In the same vein, the European Convention of Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights were mentioned as being legally binding. The UN-based International Bill of Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were also mentioned.

First instrumental justifications that were used were an interesting bunch. Human rights were said to be an "essential part of alleviating poverty, and preventing and resolving conflicts." Human rights violations were mentioned to be "often among the underlying causes of conflicts." Respecting human rights "contributes to rebuilding confidence and trust: people who feel secure that their rights are protected are less likely to resort to violence." Human rights also "help to ensure a just and sustainable peace."

How upholding human rights has these effects was not detailed. Rather, the lecturer gave a human rights perspective on the things that civilian crisis management missions try to achieve and work with. Sustainable peace, resolving conflicts and preventing violence were all formulated as human rights issues.

In summary, the instrumental justifications for upholding human rights were mostly focused on helping to manage and prevent violence and conflicts, while keeping peace sustainable. This re-contextualization of conflict and crisis management issues as human rights issues was a novel one.

The normative justifications were a discreet bundle. The exercise in the beginning tugged at heartstrings, but there was no open declaration of what is right and what is wrong: it was instead left for the participants to pick up.

The legal-political justifications were very simple: these treaties and conventions require it, and they bind the members of the EU legally.

## 6.6 Gender and UNSCR 1325

Gender is "about the social/cultural expectations and conditions of being a boy/girl, woman/man in a specific society at a specific point of time that define relationships between men and women" and that it "defines identities, statuses, roles, responsibilities and power relations". It is distinct from the more biological concept of a person's sex. (day 4, gender)

Gender perspective and mainstreaming mean that on the missions it is required to note inequalities and differences between genders, ensure non-discrimination, and recognize both women and men as actors.

Having gender as a part of the curriculum was first justified by saying that the participants will be sent to missions and countries where things related to gender roles are likely to be seen, and the aim is to give the participants the basic knowledges to recognize old-fashioned gender role thinking. While veiled, this is a normative statement: some perspectives on gender roles are undesirable and should be recognized as such when on a mission. Another normative justification was that "gender equality is a fundamental human right".

There were many instrumental reasons for noting gender issues: different genders have different security experiences, needs and priorities that need to be taken into account when designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating policies and programs. Doing this "benefits all equally!" A gender-sensitive approach also helps "Achievement of more sustainable results in peace-building efforts". Discrimination increases poverty and slows economic growth, while gender perspective helps in governance by making the policy makers "more omniscient and broader informed" (sic). A resource point was also made: "using 100% labour force" (sic) was seen as a cost effective approach.

There was also one legal-political reason cited: integrating a gender perspective and promoting women's equal participation and protection is a part of the EU's "comprehensive policy framework" "within the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy".

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) is a resolution that addresses "the impact of armed conflict on women, and women's equal participation to conflict, prevention, management, resolution and sustainable peace", "ensures that gender is mainstreamed in missions" and "calls for a gender perspective that includes the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction" (day 4, UNSCR 1325)

The justifications for having this resolution as part of civilian crisis management were much in the same vein as gender above.

Instrumental justifications were that different genders have again different perspectives and priorities, and taking them into account leads to political stability as the views of all groups are better represented. Ensuring that women participate also leads to outcomes where the examples given were a greater resilience of treaties and a more lasting impact of peace-building efforts like peace agreements. Increased participation of women also hastens economic recovery and bolsters social cohesion.

Interestingly, the only legal-political aspect of this UN resolution that was mentioned was that its implementation rests on "National Action Plans or other national-level strategies". Its legal-political status in the EU's civilian crisis management was not discussed.

The only normative justification that was visible was simply that women's participation is a matter of justice.

To sum up, most of the gender-focused topics were justified by instrumental concerns: having a gender-sensitive approach makes peacebuilding and conflict management easier and more sustainable, and gives many benefits to the society where gender equality increases.

The normative justifications were largely rallied around gender equality as a human right and a matter of justice. The idea of these lectures as giving the ability to recognize "old-fashioned" gender roles was interesting in that it contained quite a strong, if still discreet, notion of the European approach to gender equality as inherently more advanced than less equality-oriented approaches.

There was a relative lack of legal-political justifications. While UNSCR 1325 is a binding resolution, that status was not mentioned.

## 6.7 Democratisation

Democracy was defined (day 4, local ownership and democratisation) as "a political system based on free and fair elections in a multi-party system." It was expanded as a concept by saying that a democracy also "needs certain human rights to function", so it is not only about the rule of the people. This was repeated later in the lecture by emphasizing that creating elections is not enough to say that a country is now democratic.

By asking the participants, the lecturer drew together these features of a good democracy: Free media, taking care of vulnerable groups, borders, protection for citizens, freedom of movement, basic services, rule of law, justice system, population that can trust leaders and feels itself addressed in balanced way, functional and legitimate government, possibility to run for office, freedom of speech. The lecturer then added that some argue that a good democracy needs a capitalist market society to function, but this idea was clearly labelled as controversial.

Democratisation, then, was defined as a "transition through which a political system becomes more democratic." This could be a transition from an authoritarian regime to a full democracy, from an authoritarian political system to a semi-democracy, or a transition from a semi-authoritarian political system to a democratic political system. It is not a singular event but a constant change, speed of which varies.

Both democracy and democratization were connected to the concept of good governance, meaning "the process of decision-making and implementing those decisions." Good governance was defined as the United Nations definition: it is participatory, transparent,

consensus oriented, effective and efficient, responsive, equitable and inclusive, accountable and follows the rule of law. These features are quite similar to the ones defining a good democracy.

Instrumental justifications for promoting democracy and democratisation were on a quite abstract level. Democracies were mentioned to tend to have better economic growth. The democratic peace theory that democratic states are less likely to attack other democracies was mentioned to be statistically true, but with that caveat. Democracy was said to be a form of "peaceful decision-making and problem-solving", or as the lecturer continued, "ballot rather than bullet", eliciting laughter from the participants. "Mass murders and such done by leaders" were also said to be more unlikely in democracies.

A participant also contributed to this list by saying that human rights are more likely to be respected in a democracy.

One clearly normative reason was given: that "people have a right to govern themselves." In addition, there was the covert normative assumption inherent to the concepts of "good democracy" and "good governance." They are "good" by definition, and the liberal ideals connected to them are abstract but positive. This confers these terms more persuasiveness: who would want to uphold "bad democracy" or "bad governance"? Upholding these liberal values in governance and democracy is presented as unequivocally good.

To sum up, most instrumental reasons mentioned in favour of promoting democratisation were about the boons democracy supposedly gives to societies embracing it. While the opening lectures of the course recognized that the EU benefits from having resilient and well-functioning societies surrounding it, this line of thinking was not mentioned in the lecture about democratisation.

## 6.8 Code of conduct

Code of conduct was defined (day 5, code of conduct) as "a set of guiding principles and expectations that are considered binding on any person who is a member of the group."



This means how the individual mission members are supposed to conduct themselves during the mission.

Examples of breaches of code of conduct given were watching pornographic material, buying sexual services, pressuring other mission members to have sex, running a brothel, abusing alcohol, drunk-driving and careless driving.

Code of conduct was justified on two levels: mission level and individual level. Most of the lecture focused on the instrumental reasons why an individual should abide by the code of conduct: one's personal evaluation report would suffer, it might put one in danger, disciplinary action or criminal proceedings could follow, and there is a financial liability for damages. There was also a normative angle, expressed as the question "Would I be proud for doing this?" as an indicator question for whether a given action is questionable. The code of conduct was also explained to be "a guide to making the right choice", giving it normative authority.

On the mission level there were some justifications for a mission to have a code of conduct and require adherence to it. An instrumental issue was simply that "eventually there would be less problems" if an attitude such as the one taught on this lecture would be disseminated more evenly also to those mission members who haven't had this sort of training.

Another mission level justification was a normative one. The lecturer said that "Code of conduct in many parts is based on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. Breaking some parts of code of conduct is breaking human rights." This connects code of conduct into the larger ethical context of human rights that has been visible during the course.

## 6.9 Summary

To sum up, the different aspects of how CCM is done are justified and legitimized by many different arguments. Most common arguments focused on making the changes desired by CCM missions in an efficient and sustainable way. CCM missions seem to aim at permanently steering the direction of recipient societies in cost-effective ways. Ethical

principles and international treaties were rarely mentioned compared to the more practical concerns.

## 7. Analysis

In this section I will analyse the justifications detailed in the previous section. I will also contrast and compare them to literature on liberal peacebuilding and its critique.

There is no doubt that the EU's civilian crisis management fits the bill of liberal peacebuilding. It creates peace by building and developing state institutions along universalised liberal lines, reflecting what Richmond and Franks (2009, 6) call peace-as-governance. This also means that the EU's CCM mostly resembles the orthodox model of liberal peacebuilding: statebuilding and transferring values and ideas through bilaterally agreed on negotiation. It is, however, possible that the field of negotiations is not equal between the EU and the recipient country, as the EU has considerably more resources available. While the rhetoric in the course pointed strongly to the orthodox model, this inequality blurs the line separating the EU's CCM from the conservative model and its political conditionalities and imposition of state-led peacebuilding. Ideals of the emancipatory (ibid, 8-9) model were visible mostly in the weight given to local ownership, but consent and approaching from the bottom up were not discussed. The focus of local ownership was very strongly on officials and state actors. While the local society was mentioned, it remained as an abstract singular entity that the mission cooperates with. It was not discussed how to deal and negotiate with the inevitable differences and factions in local societies.

In one aspect, however, the EU's CCM differs from the body of liberal peace critique literature. While neo-liberal and free-market economic order is usually connected to the liberal peace (Richmond & Franks 2009, 4-5 and Richmond 2008, 9), economic aspects of peacebuilding were completely non-existent in the course. Economy was mentioned only a few times at all: as a possible sphere of international relations influenced by conflicts (day 3, conflict analysis and resolution), as something that is nowadays emphasized in CCM (day 1, course opening), and as something that is boosted by democratisation (day 4, democratisation). It was also mentioned that some people believe that a democracy

requires a capitalist market society to function, but this was mentioned to be controversial (day 4, democratisation).

In my data, the EU's CCM was unconditionally framed as a means of protecting EU citizens, making security both CCM's ultimate context and its major justification. This was also evidenced by locating CCM as a tool of CSDP. This EU security could be enhanced by acting proactively to solve problems in other states, enhancing their resilience and making them less fragile. Inaction would lead to domestic costs imposed on the EU, as internal and external security are interlinked. This is in line with the idea of contemporary peacebuilding that international security is threatened by weak or fragile states, not strong aggressors (Newman, Paris & Richmond 2009, 9).

Second major aspect of why the EU does CCM was its use as a tool in foreign policy. This was mentioned to happen on two levels: as part of the foreign policy of the EU and the individual policies of its member states. The CCM mission mandates are formed according to the jointly agreed-on EU foreign policy but the political considerations of the member states shape it. In addition, the member states have leeway in which missions they partake in and how they do it. One specific aspect of this was mentioned: missions can be used as methods of showing activity and interest in certain geographical areas. The examples given were the EU monitoring mission to Georgia and Finland's willingness to join the OSCE mission to Ukraine, both of which were said to have a major motivation resulting from wanting to show activity in those areas or crises.

Third major characteristic of EU's motivation to do CCM is a synthesis between the previous two aspects. The EU's CCM subscribes to an essentially liberal rules-based world view, where cooperation both between states and individuals is mediated by constructing and following common rules based on common liberal values. This is evident in how the course focused on state institutions, their governance, and their capacities: the focus was on rule of law, democratisation and abiding international norms, all concerned with ways to solve disagreements non-violently. As a lecturer said, "Ballot rather than bullet" (day 4, local ownership and democratisation).

A main tool in enhancing state resilience by CCM, as well as an intermediate goal on the way to ensuring EU security, is constructing modern liberal states and corresponding

institutions in them, thus including them in global governance and cooperation based on the international liberal order. The course portrayed what the EU deems necessary to produce a state that is a "modern", "well-functioning" "constitutional democracy" with "good governance", and how the EU aims to act to achieve that by promoting rule of law, democratisation, human rights and so on. This fits into Richmond's (2008, 10-11) view of liberal peace: domestic peace can be built by preserving a certain socio-economic order, using a particular type of constitution, or constructing an equal and just society, and this domestic peace then extends to the surrounding international community.

CCM is a major way for the EU to promote this rules-based global order and governance on institutional level, thus crafting the recipient states in the direction of EU's own liberal image and making it possible to be joined into a web of security-generating interdependence. This is directly related to the idea of liberal institutional peace detailed by Richmond and Franks (2009, 5), where peace stems from multilaterally agreed-on international normative and legal contexts. While this is seen as true on the international stage, the course had hints that it is seen so also domestically: human rights violations were mentioned to be a root cause for conflicts, and modern constitutional democracy was seen as a dispute-solving and violence-abating factor.

This dualism of political considerations and liberal ideals in CCM of the EU very clearly resembles what Richmond (2008, 13-14) calls "hybridisation of liberalism and realism" in orthodox theory of international relations. This approach was summed up in the course in the quote "When on a mission, you are not only doing good things for the population in the mission area, but also for prosperity of the Union." (day 1, EU CSDP and Comprehensive Approach). In this liberal-realist hybrid, states control force that sets the stage for democratic and liberal institutions. Social justice issues are dealt with by promoting democratisation instead of promoting social justice. Individual rights and thus justice and consent are derived from international institutions embodying universal agreements and norms, even though actors not conforming to the 'universal' norms are marginalised and might pose security issues later. As Richmond concludes, this sort of peace is seen as achievable "by actors with the necessary knowledge and resources".

Barbé and Johansson-Nogués had similar results regarding their study on the European Neighbourhood Policy. They found that the EU usually tries to act in an ethical fashion by

avoiding coercion while balancing utilities, values, rights and fairness. However, selfish utility concerns tend to overshadow other aspects when the stakes are high, such as in the context of energy security, Russian interference in third countries, or the position of Hamas in the conflicts in Middle East. According to them, the EU is best described as "a modest force for good." (Barbé & Johansson-Nogués 2008, 95-96)

Other reasons for doing CCM were less pronounced. Strong consensus on the EU values as a basis for CCM was emphasized, as they are codified in the Treaty on European Union, legally binding the member states to uphold and promote them. An important distinction here is that no treaty or agreement requires the sending of CCM missions: the missions are just a possibility and an available tool.

"Value-based responsibility" to assist other countries in need was mentioned in the context of Somalia, but that responsibility seems to be subservient to previously mentioned deliberations. Many countries can be said to need assistance, but CCM missions have this far targeted countries with a relatively close connection to security or foreign policy issues of the EU.

## 7.1 Shaping the conduct of CCM

Protecting EU citizens, achieving foreign policy goals of the EU and the individual member states, and spreading a rules-based order were the major justifications for EU to conduct CCM, with promotion of EU values and a responsibility to aid playing a lesser motivational fiddle.

When exploring the different aspects of how the EU does CCM, sustainability and efficiency were the most often-cited justifications. When talking about local ownership, comprehensive approach, gender balance, rule of law, democratisation among with other representation issues, and international humanitarian law, they were all approached strongly from the viewpoint of making the wanted changes as efficiently as possible while being also sustainable in the long run.

'Effectiveness' was usually a way to remove obstacles or otherwise help achieving the mission goals. For example, effectiveness in rule of law stemmed from affecting "deep

structures" of the society, instead of more superficial changes. In local ownership, effectiveness was making sure that the work done by the CCM mission is in line with the local needs, and gender balance was to make sure that a more representative view of those needs is available. This was put in explicitly economic terms with Comprehensive Approach, whose effectiveness was aimed at the complexity of crises: without simultaneously approaching a crisis from multiple angles, singular actions would not achieve change, and money and resources would be wasted (day 1, course opening). The effectiveness arguments were essentially ways of saying that by doing things in certain ways, most bang (societal change and stability) for the buck could be had.

This efficiency-economic argument resembles what Milja Kurki (2011a, 215-216) has identified as an attribute of a technocratic discourse in the EU decision-making: it focuses on giving an impression of its solutions to social and policy problems as rational, efficient and cost-effective, with rational and technical experts doing social and political decisions as parts of administrative, technical control.

CCM was seen as a short-term missions aiming at sustainable long-term changes, or at least starting such changes. This was explicitly articulated in the context of rule of law, and it was hinted elsewhere by emphasizing sustainability. Sustainability was usually seen as ensuring that achieved changes don't end or revert when the mission ends, but the ways to achieve sustainability were seen differently in different aspects of CCM. For Comprehensive Approach, sustainability was a result of multi-pronged actions. For local ownership, it came from getting the locals to engage with the mission. On gender lectures, including women in peace processes was said to result in a more sustainable peaces. In rule of law, sustainability was seen as affecting the deep structures of the state to ensure that change is long-term.

This emphasis on sustainability seems to be a subset of efficiency. If a desired change exists only so long as money and resources are pumped into it, that change is probably not something that has happened in the recipient society, being instead a part of the international mission.

Of course, sending an expert mission inherently contains some technocratic expert-centered assumptions. They were tempered in the course by reminders that solutions

must be created with the local counterparts, with overwhelming majority of the work described in the context of elite-elite-cooperation.

Political choices in the EU's CCM were visible in a highly polarized manner: the political nature of deciding to launch a mission and creating a mandate for it was explicit, but the political choices happening during the missions were completely invisible. This reinforces the impression that the work of CCM experts on the field is viewed as neutral, non-political solution-seeking, even though the missions themselves are agreed to be policy tools. On the practitioners' level, this resembles what Claudio Radaelli calls a technocratic mode of thinking. It is "based on the idea of the 'one best way' reachable by the 'competent' professionals who know the best means to an end. - - The political implications of decisions are denied, the conflict over ends neglected, and technocracy proceeds as if problems were challenging (and intractable for the non-professional) yet ultimately computational" (Radaelli 1999, 764).

The neglect of conflict over ends mentioned by Radaelli held true for most of the course. Political disagreement was talked entirely in terms of root causes of conflicts or the EU member states making joint decisions, while political divisions about the CCM-led reforms in the recipient country were mentioned only twice: once as personal office politics in institutions (day 5, monitoring, mentoring and advising), and once as two Kosovan officials disagreeing on the relative importance of anti-terrorism work (day 3, rule of law). At no point there was discussion or examples about how to act in such situations.

The political aspects of CCM were presented as a win-win-scenario: the recipient country gets expert help in building and developing state institutions, and the EU gets various security and foreign policy benefits. The CCM experts on the mission are just neutral actors implementing this joint project for the good of all. In the CCM context, the "one best way" described by Radaelli is a European-style liberal state with liberal institutions. Alternatives were not explored in the course, as the EU is tightly committed to the liberal order to the point where it has no other choice. Legitimacy of the EU's liberal peacebuilding still seems to rest on the assumption of universality of liberal tools, and challenging that assumption would create difficult contradictions. The assumption of universality is another way to not address the politics of CCM. After all, it is about things like 'good governance' and 'well-functioning societies' that are defined as desirable. This is

in line with how Kurki sees the democracy promotion of the EU: it is depoliticized and its normative, political and ideological questions are left undiscussed to not open up divisions between the EU member states (Kurki 2011b, 351).

In the course it was mentioned that in the EU, there is a consensus on values that have been codified in the Treaty on European Union, such as human rights and democracy (day 1, CSDP). This begs the question of whether there is also a true consensus on what those norms entail and how they are implemented, in addition to just agreeing with certain words.

## 7.2 Civilian crisis management in a web of international norms

In both why CCM is done and why it is done the way it is done there was a lot of emphasis on what is CCM's relation to different international legal-political frameworks. These include the EU's own frameworks such as CSDP, the Treaty on European Union, and Feira council decisions, and also align CCM along the baselines of international law: the UN security council resolutions, the International Bill of Human Rights, international humanitarian law and so on. This gives the impression that CCM both is and wants to be seen as being in line with the assumptions of the current international order, gaining further legitimacy and justification from that. It is rather incomprehensible to envision the EU launching a CCM mission that would contradict a UN Security Council resolution, for example.

The same sentiment is mentioned in the Treaty of Lisbon: the EU "shall contribute - - to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter" (Treaty of Lisbon 2007, title I, article 3, section 5).

This care in showing what agreements shape and define the conduct, in addition to the characteristics, of the EU's CCM reflects the development in ethics of international affairs since the 2000s. Barbé and Johansson-Nogués (2008, 82) mention that there was a shift from just promoting values to a focus on how power is exercised responsibly. The argument was that the form and the impacts of foreign policy needs to be considered in addition to its content.



I interpret this legal-political position-defining as an indicator of the EU's connection to the rules-based liberal international order. Promoting a certain normative and political order without subscribing to it themselves would undermine the credibility of the purported universalism of the norms that are promoted. By shaping its CCM along the lines of the liberal international norms and practising what it preaches, the EU upholds both its self-perception as a liberal actor and the universalist assumptions those norms contain.

In his work on the normative ethics of the EU, Ian Manners argues that references to the UN Charter and other international agreements are ways to ensure that the EU is "both normatively coherent and consistent in its policies" so the norms it promotes are "part of a more universalizable and holistic strategy for world peace" and that the EU is not hypocritical in its actions (Manners 2008, 56). Part of this is what Manners argues is one of the core normative principles of the EU: observance and promotion of "the supranational rule of law". The EU expects that both itself and its individual member states adhere to an international form of the rule of law both on and above the EU level (Manners 2008, 51-52).

This turns CCM into a sort of subtle coercion to accept the EU's norms. These liberal norms are embedded in the very fabric of the EU, making them non-negotiable and preventing locals from contesting or disputing them, at least on a rhetoric level. The EU's aid in the form of CCM is available to recipient countries only if they accept the boundaries of liberal norms and the resulting type of peacebuilding. This creates a sort of a "take it or leave it" deal, where the EU, with its considerable economic and political resources, is in much stronger negotiation position than a prospective recipient country. Paying at least lip service to the ideas of liberal peacebuilding is required of both parties. This coercion is disguised by how liberal peacebuilding is a default option among many international actors, a state of things described by Richmond (2008, 105) as a 'peacebuilding consensus.' To actors built on liberal premises, promoting them feels natural and possible coercive elements are hard to notice. After all, who would disagree with having "good governance" or "human rights"?

Similarly, the role of the EU as a third party is assumed to be naturally beneficial, legitimate, and unproblematic. Possible negative impacts of CCM missions or how to avoid them were not mentioned. This perception of unproblemacy likely results from two things:.

First, they can come from naturalizing of and strong commitment to the liberal values: how could it be wrong or amiss to promote these values, as they are universally good and appropriate? Second source is the context and the scope the course. It is aimed to prepare people to work on CCM missions, so the existence of those missions is taken for granted, as the course is a subset of that whole. There are also significant time restraints in the course: the topics discussed are wide, and most have just a lecture of two or three hours allocated to them. Because of this, it would be very interesting to do another research on a more specialized course and see if there would be more problematisations brought up: a four-day course on rule of law would likely have many more opportunities to delve deeply into the intricacies of rule of law.

One more legitimising element of CCM is consent, as it is inherent to how the EU launches CCM missions: parts of the decision-making elite of the recipient state are consulted during mission planning, and sending a CCM mission would be very unlikely in a case where the recipient state would be unwilling to host it. The course members are also encouraged and required to work with the local people and take local ownership into account, although the way this was mentioned was heavily centered on institutions and the elites running them. How these intentions actually are put to practice to enable local participation in shaping and interpretation of the mission goals and means is a question that is unfortunately outside the scope of this study, but on the course there were practically no examples or guidelines about how the local populace could be involved in shaping the missions. This lack might be a result of aforementioned time restraints on the course, but it clashes curiously with the serious weight given to local ownership in speech.

Liberal norms are wide and abstract, as norms are wont to come. This puts power in the hands of the interpreter: what does democratisation mean in a given context? While on a rhetoric level, it is unlikely that the recipients of the EU's CCM could resist liberal norms, they have more leeway in what actually happens on the ground. Richmond and Franks give as an example the UN-led peacebuilding effort United Nations Mission In Kosovo (UNMIK), where different ethnic groups tried to use the international operation to further their positions, with the Kosovo Albanians managing to dominate the resulting state through a majoritarian democratic discourse. This was accepted by the international support, as it superficially fulfilled the liberal requirements, even if the resulting peace of institutionalized ethnic divisions was not what liberal peacebuilding aimed at (Richmond &

Franks 2009, 127-129). The EU seems to have a coherent consensus on what its values are, but I estimate it likely that there is fluctuation in how they are interpreted and transferred into actions by different EU and member state decision-makers, mission members and local counterparts.

To sum up, the EU's liberal norms inform both the rules-based domestic and international orders it wants to create and the concepts of local ownership, democratisation, gender rights, rule of law and human rights it uses to drive societal changes in ways that the EU deems sustainable and efficient. The EU sees these liberal norms as universally applicable and worth spreading. The strategic end-state of the EU's CCM is a peaceful and interdependent international community sharing similar universal liberal norms of governance. These goals serve both the normative aspirations of the EU as an ethical actor towards other countries and the ultimate goal of protecting the EU and its citizens. The EU's CCM belongs to a liberal-realist hybridisation of an orthodox view on international peacebuilding, even though any economic considerations were not discussed during the course.

The Core Course can thus be seen as an exercise on upbringing the participants with the attitudes and values the EU wants to abide by on the missions. Similarly as the EU agrees to do CCM only on an expectation of the recipient state being willing to line in with the EU's liberal values, the same is expected of the EU's experts on those missions. Much of this upbringing happened via crafting a vision of what benefits the methods and values ought to deliver. Those assumptions were then not examined critically, likely due to time constraints and wanting to focus on things deemed more important for the course goals. What effects this focus has, and how it is addressed in subsequent courses, is up for debate and further research. Possible effects include opening the door for creative co-opting of mission resources by locals giving lip service to liberal ideals, and not preparing the course participants to negotiate how the liberal values are put to practice in other environments.

## **8. Conclusions**

In this part I will review my findings, the limitations of my research and discuss ideas for further research.

The purpose of this study is to describe how the EU's civilian crisis management is justified and legitimized on the ENTRi-certificated EU Concept Core Course held by Crisis Management Center Finland, where the audience is experts who are being prepared to work in civilian crisis management missions. To achieve this, I observed the course in April 2017 and looked for themes rising from my observation data via a process based on grounded theory.

The final formulation of this study is a result of quite an organic and messy research process. When I started delving into the EU's civilian crisis management, I aimed to find out how its impacts could be measured. After having trouble finding data sources to answer that question directly, I decided to study CMC's EU CCC to see how impacts are seen there. While doing preliminary work and interviews, it dawned to me that impact assessment was such a miniscule part of the EU CCC that trying to study the course's perception of it would likely fail. I went to observe the course with the idea of taking a very general qualitative approach and describe "how EU CCM is seen" in the course.

When analysing my observations, I approached the perspective question from how CCM was justified and rationalized. At the same time I noticed that many lecturers had emphasized difficulties and complicatedness of CCM work, and I worked to use that "messiness" as an another viewpoint in describing CCM, to balance the "ideal" world of justifications and rationalizations. In the end, however, I assessed that the messiness argument was not robust enough to be included, and focused my study completely on the justifications.

In a way, a circle is closed. While this final work did not process impact assessment as such, studying the justifications forms a preliminary step in future work to study the impacts. Knowing what the EU's CCM purports to achieve makes it possible to question if it succeeds in those regards, and thus approach impact assessment from one more angle.

## 8.1 Results

It is both clear and unsurprising that the EU's CCM is strongly connected to the ideas of state-centric liberal peacebuilding: this was my assumption when I started this work, and it

proved to be both true and prolific as a framework. The assumption of universal applicability and desirability of liberal values and concepts, that is criticized in much of the literature on liberal peace critique, was omnipresent in the course. It would be very interesting to know if there is more relativity and problematization around these values in other ENTRi courses, where there is a narrower focus on individual aspects of CCM. In the Core Course, there was only few hours to spare per most topics, making a more nuanced approach hard to achieve.

In how the EU's CCM was justified and legitimized, I had five main findings. These were:

1. CCM as creating security for the EU
2. CCM as adhering to and creating a rules-based liberal order, both in domestic and international contexts
3. CCM as universalist normative aspirations
4. CCM as foreign policy tools
5. CCM methods as aiming at efficiency and sustainability

The most important end goal justification for the EU to do CCM was ensuring security of the Union and its citizens. Everything else was said to be predicated on this concept in explicit terms.

The major way how the EU achieves that security via CCM is by creating and promoting liberal rules-based domestic and international orders. Thus CCM is justified by a version of liberal peace. The EU wants to craft liberal states so that they will be just, prosperous, and resilient to security challenges. As they increasingly share a common value base, they will join the liberal international community of states, forming a web of interdependence that further ensures peace and stability.

In the course, much attention was put to how CCM is positioned and aligned into the current UN-led liberal international order. Adhering to the rules-based order is imperative for the perceived legitimacy of the EU's actions and the EU's self-perception. This dual effect naturalizes the universalist assumption inherent in CCM: that a European-style liberal state is applicable everywhere. This lends credibility and legitimacy to the EU's particular brand of liberal peacebuilding.

An ethical aspect is also present in justifying CCM. The values of the EU greatly shape the conduct of CCM. Additionally, there is both a sense of responsibility towards other countries and a willingness to help making them better for their citizens. The liberal values of the EU are seen as virtuous and universal enough that promoting them is feasible and desirable.

On a more clandestine front, CCM was justified as a tool in conducting foreign policy of both the EU and its individual member states. In deciding where to embark on missions and how to design the mission mandates, there are also calculations on what the EU and the members stand to gain from the mission and what kind of messages the mission sends. The threshold on whether to launch a CCM mission to a certain country is partly dependent on how it would advance the EU interests.

The last major type of justifications was that CCM is done in ways that cause sustainable, long-term changes efficiently. CCM is seen as not a quick patch, but as a part of actions on a longer timeframe trying to change deep structures of a state. This is related to a technocratic paradigm, where CCM work is challenging and changes are hard to achieve, but it is doable with the right expertise: expert help to state institutions, officials and elites can affect the local structures thoroughly.

It strongly seems that the EU is a liberal-realist hybrid actor in its CCM too. It is a "modest force for good" in that it tries to balance selfish and altruistic concerns, aiming at win-win-scenarios where both itself and the recipient country benefit.

It is not new that the EU can be characterised as a liberal-realist actor with technocratic assumptions, liberal values, and a perchance towards shared rules. What is new is the way and scope these characteristics are found in CCM. I was unable to find any prior research that would have systematically examined the motivational basis of CCM as a whole, nor in the context of the EU Concept Core Course. While not revealing completely new aspects about the EU, this study reinforces both previous analysis on the EU and the view of the EU as an internally consistent actor across multiple sectors.

As the EU seems to be highly invested in both being and being seen as an ethical, liberal actor, introducing a critical eye towards the problemacies of its universalist assumptions

also in the Core Course would likely result in at least two things: better feedback from the experts on the field, and higher probability of local ownership occurring. Raising the possibility of locals contesting how abstract values are translated into reality and how the subsequent negotiations of values can be approached is also something that would likely benefit the experts going on CCM missions.

What was surprising was the almost complete lack of attention given to economic issues. Promoting neoliberal economics was criticized harshly in the literature on liberal peace criticism, but this was a non-issue on the course. Economy was only mentioned as an abstract sphere that can affect and be affected by issues that CCM concerns itself by. As it seems self-evident that economic issues are a major part in dealing with crises and conflicts, omitting any mention of local entrepreneurs or economic activities seems strange. One explanation might be that the economy-focused tools of the EU's Comprehensive Approach are separated from the CCM tools considered on the course and thus deemed extraneous here.

As mentioned in chapter 4 on methodology and data collection, there are two factors that limit the generalizability of my results. This was a case study of one EU Concept Core Course as it is taught in Finland by these particular lecturers. This is cushioned by the ENTRi-certificate of the course, keeping it still representative of EU-wide CCM training. Another factor is that this analysis is a result of my personal observations and possible subsequent errors and biases. I took this possibility into account in the design phase, making sure that I would do the first coding passes of my data before any deeper analysis to keep the coding as clear and non-biased as I could.

## 8.2 Further research

The aim of this study was to start sorting out what the EU's CCM tries to achieve and how it is reflected in training to pave way for further research. This study can hopefully act as a launching pad for a number of possible research avenues.

1. Can the security-enhancing justification of CCM be quantified or verified?
2. How do CCM mission members see or apply rules-basedness in their actual work environments?

3. How the liberal norms and liberal statebuilding of the EU missions are negotiated with the locals in recipient countries?
4. What kinds of differences there are in justifications used in other Core Courses hosted by other organisations than CMC Finland?
5. What foreign policy effects and impacts CCM missions have?

As for recommendations on what could be developed further in the Core Course, one of my findings seems relevant. Liberal values are deeply encoded into the EU and are fundamental in how the EU wants to conduct its foreign policy, including CCM. This obviously shapes how the training for CCM is done. Still, I was surprised by the strong universalist assumption of straight-up applicability of liberal norms in any context, with no mention of how they should be negotiated with locals. Addressing the need and the methods how the EU values are negotiated would also act as a reminder that CCM experts on a CCM mission are not politically neutral actors implementing best practices, but instead are using a degree of power, shaping the recipient society into a certain, politically chosen direction.

Writing this study has been an undertaking whose scope I was completely unable to comprehend when I started. I wrote this as the study I hoped I would have had when I started my thesis. Hopefully this overview of what the EU's civilian crisis management wants to achieve, as seen through the eyes of the people being trained to work on those missions, will act as a useful starting place for some future work.



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